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“With technology, everything just comes faster, smarter, and meaner.  But 
the basics remain the same.”1
 
“Issues involving privacy are difficult and inconsistent….In other words,  
you better think first.”2
 
[1]  Murder, kidnapping, stalking, and identity theft are all facilitated by 
the availability to the public of personally identifiable information in the 
records of state and local governments.  A recent Connecticut Supreme 
Court decision, Department of Information Technology of Greenwich v. 
Freedom of Information Commission,3 will likely spur freedom of 
information law requests for public agency databases.  Not surprisingly, 
anxiety and uneasiness about the uncontrolled availability and 
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1 COL. DAVID H. HACKWORTH & EILHYS ENGLAND, STEEL MY SOLDIERS’ HEARTS 401 
(2002). 
2 Dakotah Pratt-Hewitt, Open Government Group Seeks Amendment to Force Payments, 
THE LEGIS. GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2003, at 2 (quoting Robert Freeman, Executive Director, 
New York State Committee on Open Government). 
3 Dep’t of Info. Tech. of Greenwich v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 874 A.2d 785 (Conn. 
2005) (affirming order to release Town of Greenwich GIS database in electronic format 
in response to request under Connecticut Freedom of Information Act).  See infra notes 
80-93 and accompanying text.   
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dissemination of personal information, particularly the collection and use 
of personally identifiable information,4 have proliferated with the advance 
of the internet and the creation of large databases by corporations.5  These 
anxieties have been energized by recent revelations about the easy 
availability of personal information and of serious breaches of data 
security.6  Congress and the states have enacted a limited patchwork of 
                                               
4 Commenting about the reluctance of political campaigns to use online advertising, a 
political scientist wrote: 
Campaigns would dive into online advertising at the risk of 
antagonizing public opinion on the rising policy issue of individual 
privacy. . .Online privacy activists . . .warned ordinary users to be 
suspicious of how ads happened to appear before them and to be 
careful about volunteering information about themselves. 
MICHAEL CORNFIELD, POLITICS MOVES ONLINE: CAMPAIGNING AND THE INTERNET 44-45 
(2004). 
5 See, e.g., Carol Marie Cropper, Between You, the Doctor, and the PC, BUS. WK., Jan. 
31, 2005, at 90 (describing shift from paper to computerized health records with push to 
develop network and internet access to records and concomitant privacy concerns); Diana 
Jean Schemo, A Federal Proposal to Keep Data on All College Students Raises 
Questions of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A19 (discussing the Federal 
Government proposal to create new database of enrollment records, including social 
security numbers, of all college and university students in U.S. raised privacy concerns 
among a number of groups);  Matthew L. Wald, Airline Gave Government Information 
on Passengers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 16 (revealing that, without notice, 
Northwest Airlines gave data to NASA about ten million 2001 passengers for post 9/11 
research seeking to determine “if the government could mine the data to identify 
terrorists”); see also ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005) (examining 
competing interests of security and privacy and the relationship between government and 
private companies with extensive databases and data-mining capabilities that often serve 
as government contractors, giving government access to information without the 
restrictions often placed on government actions); infra note 50 and accompanying text.  
Professor Cornfield noted the Internet’s contribution to focusing increasing attention to 
privacy concerns:  “[I]t is premature to consider whether any issues have gained or lost 
public force from the Internet, with the important exception of privacy protection.”  
CORNFIELD, supra note 4, at 100. 
6 See, e.g., Tom Zeller Jr., Personal Data For the Taking: Students Surfing Public 
Records Learn It’s Easy to Find Out a Lot, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at C1 (reporting 
that students in a computer security course at Johns Hopkins University, using only legal, 
public sources of information (including, among other records, land deeds, occupational 
licenses, voter registrations, and court records), were able to obtain “multiple layers of 
information” about Baltimore citizens); Eric Dash and Tom Zeller Jr., Mastercard Says 
40 Million Files Are Put At Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at A1; Eric Dash, Lost 
Credit Data Improperly Kept, Company Admits, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at A1 
(reporting about security breach resulting in exposure of 40 million credit card accounts 
and 200,000 stolen records at payment processing company used by Mastercard and Visa 
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laws and regulations seeking to control the availability and use of 
personally identifiable information by the Federal Government and by 
corporate enterprises; a few of the federal laws, however, preempt more 
aggressive state laws.7  Even more limited, however, have been the very 
few efforts to control the dissemination of information by state and local 
                                                                                                                    
to facility card transactions).  A major business publication reported in mid-2005 that 
46.5 million Americans were subject to privacy breaches during the first half of 2005.  
See The Big Picture, BUS. WK., July 4, 2005, at 9; see also, Kevin Poulsen, Gone 
Missing, WIRED, July 2005, at 032 (reporting upon “dataspills” during the first five 
months of 2005, with 5,520,000 records lost, 2,029,600 attributed to hackers, but 
3,490,400 attributed to missing or stolen media or fraud).  The data breach problems 
continued into 2006, with People’s Bank of Connecticut reporting the loss of a tape with 
90,000 customer social security numbers and other confidential data, following shortly 
after the loss by LaSalle Bank Corp. of a tape containing information about two million 
residential mortgage customers.  John Christoffersen (AP), People’s loses data on 90K 
customers, GREENWICH TIME, Jan. 12, 2006, at B1. 
7 One example of preemption is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which permanently 
prevents states from enacting laws regarding the privacy of personal financial 
information that are tougher than the Federal laws.  Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 
(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1681).  In a challenge by the American Bankers Association of 
the affiliate information sharing provisions of the California Information Privacy Act, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s affiliate-sharing 
preemption clause preempted the California Act insofar as it attempted to regulate 
communication of “information” between affiliates.  American Bankers Association v. 
Gould, 412 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).  For a discussion of the politics surrounding its 
passage, see Financial Privacy, CQ WKLY., Dec. 13, 2003, at 3110.  See also Mary J. 
Hildebrand & Jacqueline Klosek, Recent Security Breaches Highlight the Important Role 
of Data Security in Privacy Compliance Programs, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J., 20 
(2005) (reviewing Federal privacy and data security requirements); Paige Norian, 
Comment, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data Personal: Attempts to Reform Online 
Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 803, 803-06 (2003) 
(noting that Congress has left several gaps in existing online privacy protection that could 
be remedied by a comprehensive Federal law, such as the Online Personal Privacy Act or 
the Consumer Privacy Protection Act);  Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing 
Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy 
Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163, 170 (2001) (arguing that although Title V of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act appears to increase financial privacy, it does not actually do so, 
due to many loopholes and exceptions).  The financial services industry is seeking to 
convince Congress to enact a law preempting 23 state data breach security laws.  Jacob 
Freedman, Industry Seeks One Law On Data Breach Alerts, CQ WKLY., Feb. 6, 2006, at 
314.  On March 16, 2006, the House Financial Services Committee approved H.R. 3997, 
which would set a national standard–“reasonably likely” chance that the information 
could be misused–for notifications about data security breaches and preempt state laws.  
Michael R. Crittenden, Bill Sets Standard for Data Security, CQ WKLY., Mar. 20, 2006, 
at 775.  See infra note 112. 
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governments within the United States.8  In the contest between privacy 
and availability of data, availability is prevailing in the United States.  The 
lack of a unified data privacy policy within the United States is in sharp 
contrast to the comprehensive European Union (E.U.) Privacy Directive, 
which applies to both public and private entities within the E.U. 
countries.9  
 
[2]  Although much is being written about threats to informational privacy, 
the literature lacks a careful analysis of the countervailing legal mandates 
and culture created by state Freedom of Information Laws and Acts 
(FOILs or FOIAs) for disclosure of information, including personally 
identifiable information, held by state and local governments in many 
databases.10   Magnified by the impact of advances in the use of digital 
technology, dissemination of these databases through FOILs offers a 
wealth of often readily available information about residents over which 
the affected residents have virtually no control.    
 
[3]  FOILs are in effect for all fifty states and the Federal Government.11  
Enacted primarily during the 1960's, at a time when state and local 
governments maintained only a few comprehensive electronic databases 
that could be accessed only by punch cards and that produced 
cumbersome paper printouts, FOILs included few provisions addressing 
their potential impact upon the privacy of personal information about 
residents.12  Over the years, FOILs have been amended to take into 
                                               
8 See infra Section IV.B.1 and accompanying text. 
9 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).  The lack of a unitary U.S. policy 
reflects the difficulty the U.S. political structure creates for enacting comprehensive, 
national social legislation.  See, e.g., CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 3 (1997) (analyzing the impact 
of the political structure of government in the United States upon attempts to create or 
continue national social service programs).   
10 A striking example is to be found in a chapter of a book addressing issues of privacy 
and security following 9/11, which, in discussing data users who can force access to data 
in government databases, mentions discovery and court-issued subpoenas but fails to 
mention FOILs.  George T. Duncan, Exploring the Tension Between Privacy and the 
Social Benefits of Governmental Databases, in A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE: PRIVACY, 
SECURITY, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 74 (Peter M. Shane, John 
Podesta, & Richard C. Leone eds., 2004). 
11 See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB. 
LAW. 65 (1996) (summarizing key provisions of the state FOILs). 
12 See infra Section III.  
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account information and data held by government agencies in electronic 
form.13   
 
[4]  Databases, however, have changed significantly since the enactment 
of the original FOILs.  Now state and local governments increasingly 
create comprehensive databases, for purposes of efficiency and improved 
“customer” service, containing in electronic, digital form vast amounts of 
personal data about residents within their jurisdiction.  These databases are 
available for viewing and copying in digital format in accordance with the 
FOILs.  The privacy implications for residents have been given little 
consideration or short shrift when they have been considered. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[5]  Paradoxically, the combination of electronic databases now held by 
state and local governments in digital form, the personal computer, 
computer networks, the internet, and FOILs may present the greatest threat 
to information privacy and to privacy more generally, a threat significantly 
greater than that created by corporate or governmental use and misuse of 
personally identifiable information.  In reality, publicly held data obtained 
under FOILs provide the sources for much of the corporate databases,14 
which, in turn, are sometimes repackaged and sold to governmental 
agencies.15  This article will address the privacy implications of these 
                                               
13 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.  
14 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2002). 
15 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C.  J. 
INTL’L. & COM. REG. 595, 596-97 (2004) (describing the sale by commercial data brokers 
of personal information–often drawn from public records–to law enforcement agencies); 
see also infra note 50 and accompanying text.  ChoicePoint is described as “perhaps the 
world’s largest private intelligence operation….ChoicePoint identifies the patterns and 
links and potential tendencies much faster, and with a sweep that would make James 
Bond’s colleagues envious.”  O’HARROW, supra note 5, at 156.  More recent events 
suggest that Federal agencies may directly be holding and using commercial data.  Eric 
Lipton, More Privacy Questions for Air Safety Agency, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at 
A25 (reporting upon inquiry by the Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office 
regarding whether the Transportation Security Administration used data from private 
companies inappropriately, including whether private commercial data with detailed 
information about passengers was stored in the government computer system).  
ChoicePoint, however, suffered a security breach in early 2005, affecting records 
involving 140,000 people in all fifty states.  Hildebrand & Klosek, supra note 7, at 20.  
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developments at the state and local government level by analyzing what 
public officials and administrators are doing and the consequences created 
by the FOILs, with particular emphasis upon the states of New York and 
Connecticut as examples of two partially contrasting views, while also 
suggesting potential solutions.   
 
[6]  Part II will appraise the accelerating use of large digital electronic 
databases by public administrators at the state and local level, which is the 
source of the threat to information privacy.  Although considerable 
attention has been paid to these issues at the Federal Government level, 
and Congress has enacted the Privacy Act16 to address some concerns 
about Federal Government databases,17 there are fifty state governments 
and over 87,500 local governments of various types in the United States.18  
Understandably, it is easier to focus on one – the Federal – government’s 
actions, but it is these 87,500 governments that are involved in most of the 
aspects of day-to-day governing that produce an enormous volume of 
records, including much personally identifiable information.19  Examples 
of such electronic data systems in use in many localities will be examined.  
                                                                                                                    
One year later ChoicePoint reached a $15 million settlement with the Federal Trade 
Commission, which included $10 million in fines and $5 million for consumer 
compensation for consumers who suffered “real damages” as a result of the ChoicePoint 
breach.  Tom Zeller Jr., U.S. Settles With Company On Leak of Consumers’ Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at C3.                   
16 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C § 552a (2000). 
17 See Damien Cave, Age 16 to 25? The Pentagon Has Your Number, and More, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A18 (reporting that since 2002 the Defense Department and a 
private contractor have been building an extensive database of 30 million 16 to 25 year 
olds for military recruitment purposes, possibly in violation of the Privacy Act because 
no public notice was made until May 2005).  But see Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  The Privacy Act does not apply to the Freedom 
of Information Act, and it was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act.  Furthermore, 
whether the Privacy Act is consistently adhered to is another concern. 
18 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 258-59 (2001), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/stlocgov.pdf (including 3,043 county 
governments, 19,372 municipal governments, and 16,629 township and town 
governments).  In some areas, residents come under the jurisdiction of several local 
governments, each setting its own policies and practices. 
19 This article will not address the additional issues created by the practice of many state 
and local governments to embark upon public-private partnerships or to “contract out” or 
delegate aspects of their functions and responsibilities to private entities (for profit or not 
for profit), thus leaving private contractors with databases of personally identifiable 
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information about their residents.  See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization As 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (questioning “whether delegations of 
authority to private entities are adequately structured to enforce constitutional constraints 
on government power”).  
 
There is increasing emphasis in public administration on the need to develop 
collaborative relationships with the private and non-profit sectors through networking in 
order to deliver services more efficiently and effectively.  See STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & 
WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNING BY NETWORK: THE NEW SHAPE OF THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR (2004).  Although the authors recognize that data privacy concerns are a 
potential barrier to integrated public-private service delivery, they address the concerns in 
only two pages (of 188) of text and present responses to the concerns that border on the 
naive.  Id. at 103-106.  
 
Several states – including Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania – supported 
initially by Federal funding, have been developing Matrix [Multistate Anti-Terrorism 
Information Exchange], a controversial database that relies upon both public and private 
databases to provide police with immediate access to public records and commercially 
collected information about people in the United States.  David Royse, Police Still Using 
Matrix-type Database, CENTREDAILY.COM, July 11, 2005, 
http://www.centredaily.com/mld/centredaily/news/nation/12105910.htm. 
 
Governments, particularly the Federal Government, are also outsourcing the collection of 
information and records.  “By outsourcing the collection of records [to corporations such 
as ChoicePoint and Lexis-Nexis], the government doesn’t have to ensure the data is 
accurate, or have any provisions to correct it in the same way it would under the Privacy 
Act.”  O’HARROW, supra note 5, at 137.  A high-ranking official – the Assistant Director 
heading the New York office – of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also expressed 
concerns about the private corporations: “There are all kinds of oversight and restrictions 
to the federal government, to Big Brother, going out there and collecting this type of 
information.  Yet there are no restrictions in the private sector to individuals collecting 
information across this country, which potentially could be a problem for the citizens of 
this country.”  Id. at 280.  One prominent practicing attorney, however, was not as 
sanguine about government’s use of information obtained from the private sector, 
criticizing the “lack of principles to guide government use of private sector data.  This 
will be big with the renewal of the PATRIOT Act.”  Barbara Yuill, Experts Say Identity 
Theft Ranks High Among Privacy, Security Topics for 2005, U.S. LAW WK., Jan. 25, 
2005, at 2431.    
 
The private entities, in turn, are increasingly outsourcing parts of their operations to other 
countries, raising further concerns about data security.  See, e.g., Pete Engardio et al., 
Fortress India?, BUS. WK., Aug. 16, 2004, at 42.  The protection of consumer data 
outsourced to other countries is becoming a leading issue, growing in prominence and 
attention.  Yuill, supra note 19, at 2430, 2431; see also Jacqueline Klosek, Data Privacy 
and Security Are a Significant Part of the Outsourcing Equation, 17 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 15, 15 (2005) (reviewing U.S. privacy law requirements implicated by 
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[7]  Although these databases include significant personally identifiable 
information, very limited attention is being given by public administrators 
to the privacy and security implications of their use.20  Few local 
governments, for example, have a designated, full-time chief privacy 
officer.21
 
[8]  What are the privacy consequences of the convergence of the digital 
age in public administration and FOILs?  Prior to the electronic age, 
considerable effort often had to be exerted to access the information 
available under FOILs, which was accessible only in paper format, in or 
                                                                                                                    
offshore outsourcing arrangements);  Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Privacy and 
Data Security in Local and International Outsourcing, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 14, 2006, at 3 
(emphasizing importance of corporations engaging in due diligence when negotiating 
outsourcing agreements involving personal information). 
20 A review of a series of books regarding management of information technology – 
including both theoretical and “hands-on” approaches – designed to provide guidance for 
public managers and for students of public administration provides telling examples.  A 
CQ Press book of 174 pages includes only one paragraph and one additional sentence, a 
total of four sentences, devoted to privacy issues.  KATHERINE BARRETT & RICHARD 
GREENE, POWERING UP: HOW PUBLIC MANAGERS CAN TAKE CONTROL OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 125, 173 (2001).  A Brookings Institution book that explores how public 
managers use information technology in complex organizations mentions privacy only in 
its last two pages.  JANE B. FOUNTAIN, BUILDING THE VIRTUAL STATE: INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 205-06 (2001).  A more applied book of 214 
pages, published by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), 
makes no mention of privacy issues.  JERSOME A S CHULZ, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MANAGERS (2001); see also 
GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, supra note 19.  A limited but more thoughtful discussion of 
privacy issues is presented in JOHN O’LOONEY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON-LINE: PUTTING 
THE INTERNET TO WORK 92–96 (2000).  In contrast, a leader of the e-business movement 
has recognized the significance of privacy issues:  
[O]ne of the great conundrums of e-business is that it gives enterprises 
a powerful new capability to capture and analyze massive amounts of 
information . . . so they can serve individual customers more 
effectively.  Yet this very capability troubles some people, who see it as 
a means to disclose or exploit their personal information.  These are 
legitimate and very real concerns, and they must be addressed if the 
world of e-business is to reach its full potential. 
LOUIS V. GERSTNER, JR., WHO SAYS ELEPHANTS CAN’T DANCE? INSIDE IBM’S HISTORIC 
TURNAROUND 328 (2002).  
21 But see GERSTNER, supra note 20, at 328–29 (including a memorandum from IBM 
Chairman and CEO reporting creation of position of Chief Privacy Officer and noting 
that privacy is, at its core, a policy issue not a technology issue). 
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through agency offices, and agencies were authorized by law to charge per 
page fees for copies.22  The information available under FOILs thus was 
subject to “practical obscurity,” the consequences of which were quite 
significant:  
 
When records data are accessible only by physical means 
(that is, by visiting government offices), the costs of travel 
and the time required to go through paper documents one 
by one will limit information gathering.  Also, it is difficult 
to remain anonymous while gathering information 
systematically under the eye of government staff.23
 
The concept of practical obscurity is recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court.  In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court upheld the Department of 
Justice’s and F.B.I.’s decision to deny the request of journalists for an 
F.B.I. rap sheet compiling conviction records from several states on the 
grounds that its release would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy, although the individual entries included within the rap sheet had 
been publicly available. 24  The Court succinctly explained the key 
concern as “whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain 
information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that 
information.”25  Now, the privacy protective consequences of practical 
obscurity have been obliterated because the extensive use and availability 
of information in electronic, digital databases create much more data, 
which then become more readily available to the public.  The threat to 
privacy is increased by the ease of data merging, data matching and data 
profiling. 
 
                                               
22 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-212(a)(1) (2004) (providing an example of a fee not to 
exceed twenty-five cents per page);  N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(1)(b)(iii) (2005) 
(providing an example of a fee not to exceed twenty-five cents per photocopy). 
23 O’LOONEY, supra note 20, at 92.  Paradoxically, more than three decades ago the use 
of computerized databases to store information made access more difficult because it 
often eliminated paper files and access to these databases was quite cumbersome.  U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS 21 n.7 (1973). 
24 United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 762–64 (1989).  
25 Id. at 764 (emphasis added). 
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[9]  Strikingly, residents have little or no control over the handling and 
disposition of the information and usually no knowledge of the 
distribution of digital information about them.26  The implications for 
privacy of residents are enormous, as is the potential use of data for 
criminal activities such as kidnapping,27 murder, identity theft, and 
stalking.28   
 
                                               
26 Concern about the rights of those included in databases was expressed more than thirty 
years ago in a major Federal Government report, but in the interim state and local 
governments have lost sight of these issues: 
An individual’s personal privacy is directly affected by the kind of 
disclosure and use made of identifiable information about him in a 
record.  A record containing information about an individual in 
identifiable form must, therefore, be governed by procedures that afford 
the individual a right to participate in deciding what the content of the 
record will be, and what disclosure and use will be made of the 
identifiable information in it.   
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 23, at 40–41. 
27 A rare expression of editorial concern about personally identifiable information 
available on the internet appeared following the kidnapping of a very wealthy financial 
executive in Greenwich, Connecticut.  Editorial, Kidnapping Indicates New Realities, 
GREENWICH TIME, Jan. 19, 2003, at A16.  The same newspaper, however, appears to 
misunderstand completely the significance and consequences of the Geographic 
Information System [GIS] litigation with which the town is involved.  Editorial, Is 
Appeal Justified in Map-Access Case?, GREENWICH TIME, Jan. 18, 2004, at A16 
(questioning the town’s decision to appeal adverse Superior Court decision).  See infra 
notes 68–93 and accompanying text.  In a series of articles published in the newspaper 
during “Sunshine Week,” March 12-18, 2006, the writers emphasize the availability of 
government records and disparage concerns about privacy.  See, e.g.,Vesna Jaksic, 
Government Information; There just for the asking, GREENWICH TIME, Mar. 14, 2006, at 
A1. 
 
The victim of the kidnapping–Edward Lambert–was later the subject of the cover story in 
a national business magazine, a story which begins by describing the tight security now 
surrounding Mr. Lambert.  Robert Berner, The Next Warren Buffett?, BUS. WK., Nov. 22, 
2004, at 144.  Needless to say, most people do not have the resources to provide 
themselves with this level of private security.  Consequently, wide dissemination of 
information about their homes and properties poses a much greater threat to them.   
28 See, e.g., Harry A. Valetk, Reclaiming Privacy, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 2003, at 5 (citing 
examples of publicly available data leading to instances of stalking and identity theft); 
see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006-08 (N.H. 2003) (noting 
consequences of stalking and identity theft, and determining on certified question that, 
following a workplace murder made possible by data searches, an investigative service 
which supplied the key information to the killer may be liable).  
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[10]  Part III will analyze the use of state FOILs by members of the public 
to access the information within these state and local government 
databases, the key issue to address in protecting information privacy.  The 
operation of the FOILs in New York and Connecticut will be considered 
as examples.  These neighboring states have taken somewhat different 
approaches to the implementation of their FOILs.  New York is 
recognizing in a modest way some of the privacy concerns of its residents, 
but Connecticut continues to implement its open records policies with 
seemingly little or no concern for the privacy of its residents.   
 
[11]  FOILs make information held by government agencies available to 
the public, with very limited exceptions.  Their emphasis upon open 
government creates a presumption that government-held information is 
available for public review and copying.29  FOIL amendments in many 
states now require that data held by agencies in electronic format be made 
available in electronic format at minimal cost.30   Most FOILs give little, if 
any, consideration to their impact upon the privacy interests of residents 
from and about whom data has been collected.31  
 
[12]  As the digital age and the internet developed, however, FOILs have 
become subject to a phenomenon that Professor Lawrence Lessig, in the 
context of copyright, has labeled technological inversion.32  
“Technological inversion happens when a set of values originally 
                                               
29 See, e.g., Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 609 A.2d 998, 1000 
(Conn. 1992) (holding that in keeping with the policy of FOIA favoring disclosure and 
requiring that exceptions to disclosure be narrowly construed, city police department did 
not satisfy burden of proving municipal permits to carry pistols were similar to exempt 
medical and personnel files); Capital Newspapers v. Whalen, 505 N.E.2d 932, 935-37 
(N.Y. 1987) (holding that personal and unofficial documents intermingled with official 
government files in office of Mayor of City of Albany are records subject to disclosure 
under FOIL). 
30 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-211(a) (2004); Brownstone Publishers, Inc. v. New 
York City, 550 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 (1990) (holding that in response to FOIL request by 
publishing company, New York City department ordered to provide records on computer 
tape rather than hard copy).   
31 Few states have privacy laws similar to the U.S. Privacy Act, which, in any event, do 
not supersede the FOILs. See 37A AM. JUR. 2d Freedom of Information Acts § 410-413 
(dealing with state privacy acts).  Some states have enacted general statutes that establish 
fair information practices dealing with the government’s processing of personal 
information.  PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 131 
(1996); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (2004); infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
32 Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763, 766-767 (2003). 
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protected . . . get flipped because the technology embedding those values 
changes.  The world becomes the opposite of what it was, not because 
politicians have changed the law or the Constitution, but because 
technologies have changed the interpreted context.”33  Digital technology 
has made the ability to obtain, collect, compile, manipulate, mine, and 
transfer data vastly easier than it was thirty-five to forty years ago when 
most FOIL laws were enacted and consequently has made possible data 
mining and analysis that were, in a practical sense, not feasible thirty-five 
years ago.34
 
[13]  Is the release of these publicly held databases containing personally 
identifiable information consistent with the original purposes of FOILs?  
The purposes of the FOILs will be appraised.  FOIL administrators and 
advocates almost unthinkingly reject any perceived threats to openness 
(transparency) and seek to apply FOILs blindly to electronic databases of 
personal information, a telling example of technological inversion.  FOIL 
administrators and review bodies rely heavily upon the presumption of 
openness and are loath to reject requests for information upon other than 
the clearest statutory mandates.35  Court decisions have generally deferred 
                                               
33 Id. 
34 The power of digital technology is demonstrated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s initiative to digitize millions of fingerprint cards and connect law-
enforcement agencies to the huge new database of fingerprints.  The new system “can 
scan its 46 million sets of prints in minutes, a process that used to take six months by 
hand.”  Lorraine Woellert, Streamlining: FBI, BUS. WK., Nov. 24, 2003, at 96; see also 
O’HARROW, supra note 5, at 43 (quoting Paul Saffo of the Institute for the Future, 
commenting upon the advance in computing power, paired with the internet: “It used to 
take an army of gumshoes to do what an individual can do clicking their keyboards in a 
matters of minutes”).  In contrast, in 1973 a Federal Government report stated: 
The possibility of using a large computer to assemble a number of data 
banks into a “master file” so that a dossier on nearly everybody could 
then be extracted is currently remote, since the ability to merge 
unrelated files efficiently depends heavily upon their having many 
features of technical structure in common, and also on having adequate 
information to match individual records with certainty….At the present 
time, however, compiling dossiers from a number of unrelated systems 
presents problems that few organizations, and probably no 
organizations outside of government, have the resources to solve.   
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 23, at 20-21. 
 
35 See, e.g., Dir., Ret. & Benefits Servs. Div. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 775 A.2d 981, 
987 (Conn. 2001) (noting “that there is an overarching policy underlying the [act] 
 12
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 3 
 
to these agency actions.36  This part will also examine a mirror-image 
problem, the sale of personal information databases by state and local 
governments.  
 
[14]  Part IV will then consider what solutions are available to control the 
release and dissemination of personally identifiable information 
notwithstanding the FOILs.  States and municipalities may be able to 
prevent dissemination, although not release, of information within many 
electronic databases through the judicious use of copyright law.37  
Residents who do not wish personally identifiable information released to 
the public may seek to avail themselves of United States statutory and 
Constitutional protections.  A handful of Supreme Court cases have 
addressed the question of the use by and release of personally identifiable 
information collected in electronic databases by state and local public 
agencies.38  Unlike transactional information voluntarily given to 
corporations during commercial transactions, residents are forced to 
disgorge personal information to state and local governments under legal 
compulsion,39 to exercise their constitutional rights and civic 
responsibilities to vote and serve on juries, to obtain essential documents 
and authorizations,40 to receive public services, and to use government 
facilities and services.41  Should they subsequently forfeit all control of 
the disposition of the information so provided?  There are potential 
Constitutional remedies available.  Part V will offer concluding thoughts. 
 
II. ELECTRONIC DATABASES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:  
THE THREAT TO DATA PRIVACY 
                                                                                                                    
favoring disclosure of public records.  It is well established that the general rule under the 
[act] is disclosure, and any exception to that rule will be narrowly construed.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
36 See, e.g., Davis v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 790 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Conn. 2001) 
(noting that “[o]rdinarily, great deference is given to the construction given a statute by 
the agency charged with its enforcement” and that “[a]n agency’s factual and 
discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts”); see 
also 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts § 569 (2004) (citing cases in which 
deference is paid to agency review). 
37 See infra section IV.C.  
38 See infra section IV.B.2. 
39 Examples include school registration, vaccination records, and drug use.   
40 Documents include driver’s licenses, vehicle registrations, marriage licenses, real 
property title, welfare benefits, etc. 
41 Examples include parks and recreational facilities, senior citizen centers, and libraries. 
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A. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DATABASES 
 
[15]  Governments have maintained records about people within their 
jurisdiction since time immemorial.  For the most part, such records were 
limited and kept confidential.  As government record keeping grew and 
became more commonplace during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, 
public resistance to the disclosure of the information also grew, and courts 
and legislatures supported limitations on public access to the 
information.42   
 
[16]  The world of information collection, however, changed dramatically 
after World War II with the invention of the mainframe computer, which 
enabled the systematic storage of large amounts of data in databases.43  A 
second revolution began in the 1980's and continued into the 1990's with 
the advent of digital technology, personal computers, and the internet.  As 
a consequence, information, including personally identifiable information, 
is now maintained and made available in electronic format in response to 
FOIL requests and for other purposes.  In such form the data can be easily 
transferred and recombined with other available data.44  It also can be 
transported or stored easily in media such as CDs and floppy disks.  It can 
be conveyed thereafter through telephone, cable, and fiber optic networks, 
as well as through wireless networks (wi-fi).  In addition, information 
previously available only in paper records in an office during regular 
business hours can now be posted to the internet for all to see, copy, and 
transfer.  Professor Randall Davis45 has observed: 
 
This trio of technological developments–digital 
information, computer networks, and the Web–are together 
the source of profound changes in society.  Digital 
                                               
42 Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 
1907 (1981). 
43 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1402 (2001).  The first commercial sale of a 
computer was to the U.S. Census Bureau in 1951. SCHULTZ, supra note 20, at 5. 
44 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Web Site Causes Unease in Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
2003, at A12 (describing how a police critic posted, on the internet, Washington State 
police officers’ addresses, home phone numbers, and social security numbers obtained 
from records of voter registrations, property, motor vehicle, and other official records).  
45 Professor of Computer Science at M.I.T. 
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information radically changes the economics and character 
of reproduction; computer networks radically change the 
economics and character of distribution; and the Web 
radically changes the economics and character of 
publication.46
 
Digital technology converts words and numbers (as well as sounds and 
images) into data bits and bytes, and the converted data instantaneously 
can be transmitted electronically, monitored, copied, merged, and 
duplicated.  “Information in digital form is orders-of-magnitude easier, 
faster, and cheaper to reproduce than is information in analog form (for 
example, hard copy).”47  Information available in a digital format is 
subject to many fewer limitations.  “Digital copies are…perfect, so each 
one in turn can be the seed for additional perfect copies, quite unlike the 
situation with traditional media like photocopies.”48  
  
[17]  From a less theoretical perspective, Louis Gerstner, former Chairman 
and CEO of IBM, has commented: 
 
It’s already clear that a networked world raises many 
issues, such as the confidentiality of medical or financial 
records, or the freedom of expression v. protections of 
personal privacy.  Think about the privacy implications of 
what’s coming.  What happens to personal privacy in a 
world of Internet-enabled cars that monitor our movements 
at all times; cell phones that continuously report their 
location; or Net-connected pacemakers and other medical 
devices that are gathering real-time data on our heartbeat or 
blood pressure, cholesterol level or blood-alcohol content?  
Who’s going to have access to that most personal profile of 
you–your physician alone?  Law enforcement agencies?  
An insurance provider?  Your employer or a potential 
employer?49
                                               
46 Randall Davis, The Digital Dilemma, 44 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 77, 79 
(2001).  
47 Id. at 78. 
48 Id. (emphasis added).  
49 GERSTNER, supra note 20, at 350 (discussing the future of e-business); see, e.g., Amy 
Harmon, Lost? Hiding?  Your Cellphone Is Keeping Tabs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at 
1 (describing cellular phone services that allow customers to locate family members 
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Users of the available technology rely significantly upon public records 
made available by FOIL:  “The power of web data collection, tracking, ad 
presentation, and similar technologies, combined with other traditionally 
public record data sources (and voter registration roles are just the tip of 
the iceberg) creates a scenario that might cause Darth Vader to be 
jealous.”50  
 
[18]  According to Professor Davis, “The second major source of 
difficulties…is the routine presence of computers and the Web in work 
settings, and increasingly in households as well. Technology found only in 
research laboratories not long ago is now a widely available consumer 
product.”51  With the spread of personal computers in the home and at 
work, most of the teen and adult population of the country can access Web 
data through search engines twenty four hours a day, seven days a week.52  
“One consequence is that individuals routinely have the means and 
opportunity to access and copy vast amounts of digital information…but 
lack a clear picture of what is legal or ethically acceptable.”53
 
[19]  Nevertheless, state and local government executives and managers 
are under increasing pressure to develop and enhance e-government 
capabilities.  E-government describes access to and the delivery of 
information and services by government online by digital means, primarily 
using the internet.54  Many, if not most, state and local governments are 
                                                                                                                    
though global positioning technology; thus, indicating the reality of what Gerstner 
predicts is arriving).  
50 Lauren Weinstein, Web Tracking and Data Matching Hit the Campaign Trail, 8 
PRIVACY FORM DIGEST 22 (1999), http://www.vortex.com/privacy/priv.08.22 (writing 
about presidential candidate ad buys in December, 1999). 
51 Davis, supra note 46, at 79.  
52 See John Markoff, Internet Use Said to Cut Into TV Viewing and Socializing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at C5 (describing the results of a study  that found approximately 
75 percent of the population of the United States is estimated to have access to the 
Internet either at home or at work).  
53 Davis, supra note 46, at 79.  Although the observation is made in the context of 
intellectual property, it is equally applicable to personally identifiable information. 
54 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified in scattered 
sections of 44 U.S.C.); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE E-
GOVERNMENT IMPERATIVE 23 (2003) (defining e-government as “equated to the use of 
ICTs [information and communications technologies] in government.  While the focus is 
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placing policies, publications and databases online and are delivering 
government services online for residents.55     
 
[20]  Some of the reasons for the move to online information and services 
are well intentioned and similar to those of private business; they include 
lowering transaction costs and improving “customer” relations.56  
Pressures to improve administration and service delivery, particularly at 
times of fiscal retrenchment, have led to the development of and increased 
reliance upon electronic databases and automated systems.  Agency heads 
are seeking to reduce mail transactions and visits to offices, both of which 
require greater amounts of personnel and space.  Budget savings are 
potentially very significant: 
 
Movement from paper-based to web-based processing of 
documents and payments typically generates administrative 
cost savings of roughly 50 percent–more for highly 
complex transactions.  This figure ignores additional 
savings of money, time, travel, and effort to citizens and 
intermediate institutions….The sheer volume of 
government transactions suggests the enormous savings 
electronic transaction processing alone could provide.57
 
                                                                                                                    
generally on the delivery of services and processing, the broadest definition encompasses 
all aspects of government activity”). 
55 GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, supra note 19, at 18-19.    
56 O’LOONEY, supra note 20, at 4, 23-24. 
57 FOUNTAIN, supra note 20, at 5; see also Stacy Albin, Albany: License Renewal Goes 
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2003, at B5 (renewing drivers’ licenses online, by N.Y.S. 
Dept. of Motor Vehicles, with a receipt printed on a home computer serving as a 
temporary license); Micheline Maynard, Will This Idea Fly? Charge Some Travelers $10 
for Showing Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at C1 (describing a cutting edge example, 
from the private sector, being implemented from Northwest Airlines, in charging an extra 
ten dollar fee for tickets issued at airports, a five-dollar fee for tickets purchased by 
telephone over its reservation lines, and leaving purchases through the airline’s web site 
as the only way to avoid the fee); Bob Tedeschi, Airlines, Needing to Cut Costs, Urge 
Travel Agents to Switch to a Web-Based Reservation System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, 
at C4 (explaining how airlines are encouraging travel agents to shift from mainframe 
systems to web-based reservation systems, in part, because Web-based systems cost 
airlines about one dollar for every ticket booked in contrast to more than ten dollars per 
ticket with mainframe systems).   
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The use of private contractors to provide some government services 
expands the scope of those with access to and control over government 
information.58  Computer and communications technologies have made it 
easier and cheaper for governments to use partners outside of 
government,59 and state and local governments are increasingly using 
private partners.60   
 
[21]  In addition, the desire by residents to conduct transactions with 
government agencies over the Internet, a reflection both of convenience 
and of developments in the private sector,61 requires electronic access to 
databases.  “A[s] the Internet has grown up and consumers have become 
accustomed to going online for everything from banking to buying movie 
tickets, cities large and small have joined in by making more municipal 
services available on the Web.”62  In the public arena, in contrast to the 
private sector, failure to implement e-government services can have 
adverse political consequences for elected executive branch officials, 
particularly when the private sector and other governments are doing so.63
                                               
58 An example is the Connecticut vehicle emissions testing program, which provides the 
contractor–Agbar Technologies–with online access to information about vehicle 
registrations.  See, e.g., William Yardley, Emission Tests Will Resume After a Six-Month 
Suspension, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004, at B6 (reporting restart of the Connecticut vehicle 
emissions testing program following a six-month shutdown by the state because of 
contractor software problems); JAMES J. FAZZALARO, OFFICE OF  LEGISLATIVE 
RESEARCH, MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION PROGRAM (2004),  available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0669.htm (analyzing difficulties with operation 
of emissions testing program and options).  Once again, the information privacy goals of 
the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994 are vitiated.  See infra notes 153-163 and 
accompanying text; see also Metzger, supra note 19, at 1370 (questioning whether 
delegations of authority to private entities are adequately structured to enforce 
constitutional constraints on government power). 
59 GOLDSMITH & EGGER, supra note 19, at 17.  
60 Id. at 11 (noting that state government contracts with private firms increased by 65 
percent during the five-year period between 1996 and 2001). 
61 GERSTNER, supra note 20, at 165-175 (describing IBM’s new focus on e-business as a 
central theme of its new business model). 
62 Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Service Is a Struggle For Virtual Town Halls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
25, 2003, at G5; see also Neil Vigdor, Snagged by the Web: Town Boosts Services on 
Internet Site, GREENWICH TIME, Aug. 6, 2004, at A1 (reporting on increased service 
provided by Town of Greenwich online, with the town’s information technology director 
touting idea of a virtual Town Hall, with “[t]wenty-four seven government”).   
63 See, e.g., Ronald Smothers, Governor Says The Problems With E-ZPass Are Solved, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at B5 (describing political backlash following New Jersey’s 
difficulties in implementing E-ZPass on the State’s highways); see also Vigdor, supra 
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[22]  A brief look at three databases–voter registration, geographic 
information system (GIS),64 and recreation management–used by many 
local governments illuminates the issues.  All three are in use by 
Greenwich, Connecticut, a medium-size Connecticut town (population 
approximately 62,000)65 recently involved in FOIL litigation regarding its 
GIS system.66  The town’s voter registration system includes the following 
information for 38,000 registered voters: name, address, date of birth, and 
political party affiliation.67  A key element from the privacy standpoint is 
the inclusion of residents’ dates of birth.    
 
[23]  The GIS includes the following information for each property in the 
town: address, property ownership, aerial digital photographs, and the 
location of roads, utility, fiber optic networks, and sewer lines.68  Invoking 
the Connecticut FOIA, a self-employed computer consultant requested a 
copy of “the GIS database backup tapes,” including “orthophotography,69 
arc info coverages,70 SQL server databases71 referenced to GIS data, and 
                                                                                                                    
note 62, at A1 (Greenwich first selectman describing Town web services as “essential for 
communicating with constituents” and saying “they’re now must haves”). 
64 “GIS is a computer system capable of assembling, storing, manipulating, and 
displaying geographically referenced information that may by used to make multifaceted 
interrelationships among many types of data visually intelligible.”  County of Suffolk v. 
First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 186 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2001).  
65 U.S. Census Bureau (2002), http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/tables/SUB-
EST2003-05-09.pdf.  
66 See infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text. 
67 E-mail from Laurence Simon, Member of Town of Greenwich Board of Estimate and 
Taxation, to Ira Bloom, author (Oct. 26, 2005) (on file with author); see also infra note 
105.  
68 Whitaker v. Dir. Dep’t of Info. Tech., No. FIC2001-546 (F.I.C. C.T. 2002), available 
at http://www.state.ct.us/foi/2002FD/20021113/FIC2001-546.htm.  
69 Orthophotography is defined as “digital imagery in which distortion from the camera 
angle and topography have been removed, thus equalizing the distances represented on 
the image.”  GIS Lounge, Glossary, 
http://gislounge.com/glossary/bldeforthophotography.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).  
70 ArcInfo coverages are created from sources such as paper maps and photographs, 
which then must be converted through a series of steps to digital form.  University of 
California Davis, Review of Understanding GIS – the ARC/INFO Method, 
http://ice.ucdavis.edu/local/gis/arctut4.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).  
71 SQL refers to Structured Query language, “a standard language used to formulate 
queries posed to databases.”  Martin Libiicki Et Al., SCAFFOLDING THE NEW WEB: 
STANDARDS AND STANDARDS POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY xxii (2000).   
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all documentation created to support/define coverages,”72 essentially all of 
the town of Greenwich’s computer data used in connection with its GIS 
system.  The consultant declined the town’s offer to provide him with 
printed maps.73  He stated that he intended to use the GIS data to market 
and sell various services, which may involve posting the data on the 
internet.74  The town denied the FOIA request and the consultant then 
appealed to the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, which 
ordered the town to provide the requested information.75  The town 
thereafter appealed the Commission’s decision to the Superior Court, 
which affirmed the decision of the Commission.76    The town, in turn, 
                                               
72 Brief for the Plaintiff at 2, Director Department of Information Technology v. Freedom 
of Information Commission & Stephen Whitaker, No. CV 03 0519153-S (Aug. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter Brief for the Plaintiff] (on file with author). 
73 Whitaker v. Dir. Dep’t of Info. Tech., No. FIC2001-546 (F.I.C. C.T. 2002) (illustrating 
the value of digital, as opposed to analog, data); see Davis, supra note 46 and 
accompanying text.  If the consultant’s purpose were to evaluate the Town’s 
governmental operations, printed maps would serve the purpose.  Mr. Whitaker, however, 
claimed “I can’t do any analysis from a paper map.”  Neil Vigdor, Town Raising Prices 
for GIS Aerial Photos, GREENWICH TIME, Nov. 19, 2004, at A1 (reporting upon increased 
price charged by Town of Greenwich for GIS aerial property photos).  Although one 
expert has noted that analog data can be scanned, there would be considerable difficulty 
and potential for considerable deterioration of data in scanning all of the data in so large a 
file.  Denise G. Callahan, Internet Access to Court Documents Is Creating Privacy 
Problems, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, Mar. 28, 2005 (quoting Jim McMillan, Director, 
Court Technology Laboratory, National Center for State Courts).    
74 Neil Vigdor, GIS Data Could Go Public: Town Plans to Fight FOI Officer’s Findings 
on Access, GREENWICH TIME, Oct. 25, 2002, at A1. 
75 Whitaker v. Dir. Dep’t of Info. Tech., No. FIC2001-546 (F.I.C. C.T. 2002) 
76 See Vigdor, GIS Data Could Go Public, supra note 74, at A1; Neil Vigdor, Town Loses 
Public-Records Case, GREENWICH TIME, Jan. 6, 2004, at A1 (reporting decision by 
Superior Court Judge Harold Owens Jr.).  Greenwich, often described in the media as an 
affluent town, is the home of many senior corporate executives and celebrities.  See, e.g., 
Berner, supra note 27, at 144; Hugh Eakin, Greenwich Gets a Renaissance All Its Own, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at 38 AR (reporting changes made by a new Director at the 
Town’s Bruce Museum of Art and Science, while describing Greenwich as an affluent 
community “which is better known for its coveted suburban real estate than for 
exhibitions of art” and stating that the Director has “proved adept at connecting with his 
well-heeled Greenwich base”);  Alison Leigh Cowan, Millionaires Made of Steel May 
Avoid An Old Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 3 CT (reporting upon potential impact 
of Connecticut Governor’s proposal to repeal Connecticut personal property tax on 
automobiles, but emphasizing number of very high priced cars registered in Town of 
Greenwich).            
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appealed the decisions to the Connecticut Court of Appeals.77  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court, however, decided to hear the appeal, 
bypassing the Court of Appeals.78  The case achieved national attention, 
with three groups–the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the 
Society of Environmental Journalists, and Investigative Reporters and 
Editors, Inc.–filing an amicus brief in support of the Commission and Mr. 
Whitaker.79      
 
[24]  On June 21, 2005, the Connecticut Supreme Court released its June 
15th unanimous decision.80  The court emphasized the FOIA statutory 
policy which favors disclosure, explaining that “any exception to that rule 
will be narrowly construed in light of the general policy of openness 
expressed in the [act].”81  The standard of review appropriate in applying 
the meaning of the exemptions is “whether the commission’s factual 
determinations are reasonably supported by substantial evidence in the 
record taken as a whole.”82  
 
[25]  The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected several principal arguments 
put forward by the town.  In response to the contention that the GIS was 
                                               
77 Ivan H. Golden, Appeal Planned on GIS Decision, GREENWICH TIME, Jan. 10, 2004, at 
A1 (reporting decision of the town to appeal Superior Court decision); Neil Vigdor, Town 
Seeks Visual Appeal, GREENWICH TIME, July 31, 2004, at A1 (reporting the town’s 
attempt to make visual demonstration of its GIS before Connecticut Court of Appeals).  
78 Neil Vigdor, Supreme Review: State’s Highest Court to Hear Town Case on Public 
Records, GREENWICH TIME, Sept. 22, 2004, at A1 (reporting that Connecticut Supreme 
Court decided to hear the case, leap-frogging the Court of Appeals); Ivan H. Golden, 
State’s Highest Court to Hear GIS Case Jan. 6, GREENWICH TIME, Dec. 21, 2004, at A3 
(reporting that Supreme Court scheduled oral arguments for Jan. 6, 2005).   
79 Ivan H. Golden, GIS Case Gains National Attention, GREENWICH TIME, Oct. 22, 2004, 
at A1; Ivan H. Golden, News Groups Back Release of Town Data, GREENWICH TIME, 
Nov. 10, 2004, at A1(reporting comments by several organizations and academics).    
80 Dir., Dep’t of Info. Tech. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 874 A.2d 785 (Conn. 2005) 
(affirming order to release Town of Greenwich GIS database in electronic format in 
response to request under Connecticut Freedom of Information Act, two justices not 
participating in the decision); Neil Vigdor, Town Ordered to Give Up Records, 
GREENWICH TIME, June 16, 2005, at A1 (reporting Connecticut Supreme Court decision 
ordering release of GIS database). 
81 Dir., Dep’t of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d at 791 (quoting Ottochian v. Freedom of Info. 
Comm’n, 604 A.2d 351 (Conn. 1992)) (internal citations omitted).  
82 Id. (quoting Rocque v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 774 A.2d 957 (Conn. 2001)) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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entitled to exemption from disclosure as a trade secret,83 the court found 
that because the GIS data is readily available to the public it did not fall 
within the trade secret exemption: 
 
Members of the public seeking the GIS data could obtain 
separate portions of the data from various town 
departments, where that data is available for disclosure.  
The requested GIS database simply is a convenient 
compilation of information that is already available to the 
public.  The records therefore fail to meet the threshold test 
for trade secrets, that the information is not generally 
ascertainable by others.84    
 
The court’s rationale ignores the significance of the electronic database 
both for purposes of resolving the trade secret issue and more generally.  
The database is more than a convenient compilation of information that is 
already available to the public in analog form.  Releasing “the GIS 
database backup tapes including orthophotography, arc info coverages, 
SQL server databases referenced to GIS data, and all documentation 
created to support/define coverages”85 enables the recipient to utilize the 
system itself, not just the information included in the system.  The court 
fails to distinguish between the information held within the system and the 
system itself, which is the trade secret.  The release of the backup tapes 
also enables the recipient to manipulate, mine, and transfer the data, as 
well as to merge the data with other databases.86    As already noted, the 
impact of digital compilations upon privacy and security can be 
extraordinary, particularly if, as suggested at one point by the requestor in 
this case, the data may be placed on the Internet.87  The consequences of 
technological inversion are ignored by the court.   
 
[26]  The court also rejected the town’s arguments involving both physical 
safety and information security.  The court concluded that the Police 
Chief‘s testimony was insufficient to establish that the release of the GIS 
                                               
83 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(5)(A)(2004). 
84 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d at 795 (emphasis added). 
85 Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 72, at 2; see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying 
text for definitions of these terms.   
86 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.   
87 Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 72, at 3.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.   
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data would pose a safety risk for the town or its residents.88  The court 
supported the trial court’s suggestion that statistical data correlating 
criminal or terrorist activity with the disclosure of GIS data would have 
been helpful in establishing the risks.89  It is difficult to see, however, how 
the statistics could be amassed until after the GIS database is released, and 
then, of course, the damage would be done.  The court also rejected as 
insufficient the testimony of the town’s Director of Information 
Technology, presumably expert testimony, that the release of the GIS 
database would compromise the security and integrity of the town’s 
information technology system.90
 
[27]  Finally, the court faulted the town for failing at an earlier stage of the 
case to avail itself of a 2002 amendment to the Connecticut FOIA which 
amended exemption nineteen, involving safety risks, by adding a 
procedure for consultation with the Commissioner of Public Works.91  
“The plaintiff never sought the required consultation with the 
commissioner of public works.  Nor did he at any time request that the 
trial court remand the case so that the public works commissioner could 
make a public safety determination.”92
 
[28]  Although there are several statements in the opinion noting the 
town’s failure to invoke available procedures and possible failures of 
proof, the court itself, nevertheless, is responsible for the troublesome 
aspects of the opinion.  The court fails to recognize the consequences to 
public policy of the migration of public records to digital databases.  
Further, as in Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission,93 a case 
involving the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, the court almost blindly 
                                               
88 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d at 793. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 795; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(20)(2004).  
91 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d at 791; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-
210(b)(19)(A)(2004); see infra note 142 and accompanying text.  
92 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d at 792.  Following the decision the dispute 
continued, with Whittaker complaining before the Connecticut Freedom of Information 
Commission that the Town is withholding some of the data.  Following a decision by the 
Commissioner of Public Works, the Town removed a few “layers of data” showing 
locations of fire hydrants, manholes, storm drains, and utility poles.  Kenneth Partridge, 
GIS fight continues, Greenwich Post, Dec. 1, 2005, at 1A and Brian Lockhart, FOI 
Commission is ‘agency of the people,’ GREENWICH TIME, Mar. 16, 2006, at A1. 
93 Davis v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 790 A.2d 1188 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001); see infra 
notes 157-160 and accompanying text. 
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supports the most far-reaching interpretation of the FOIA without giving 
adequate weight to countervailing legal and policy considerations.  
 
[29]  The seemingly benign department in town government–the 
Department of Parks and Recreation–maintains and uses a recreation 
management system database for issuing park passes, tennis permits, golf 
permits, and registering participants for most of the Town’s recreation 
programs.94   At present, under the current interpretations of Connecticut’s 
FOIL, all three of these databases (voter registration, GIS, and recreation 
management) can be requested under FOIL in electronic format and likely 
would have to be made available.  The three databases are not the only 
ones used by the town of Greenwich.  Others include real and personal 
(boats and cars) property tax assessments,95 library card holders,96 and 
holders of railroad parking stickers,97 an important matter in a town with a 
significant number of commuters.   
 
[30]  As is typical, the town does not have any central review or 
policymaking forum that addresses how electronic databases with 
personally identifiable information are managed.98  Furthermore, a larger 
                                               
94 The system in use is RecTrac.  Vermont Systems, RecTrac, 
http://www.vermontsystems.com/scripts/vsiweb.wsc/rectrac.htm?xxpref=RT (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2006) (providing descriptions of the components and capabilities of the RecTrac 
system); see also Fitness Solutions, RecTrac, 
http://leisuresolutions.sportingpulse.com/index.php?id=12 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
95 See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text. 
96 Librarians are concerned about requests by law enforcement officials for information 
about reading material and other internal matters, reporting over 200 formal and informal 
inquiries made to libraries since October 2001.  Eric Lichtblau, Libraries Say Yes, 
Officials Do Quiz Them About Users, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at A11.  Even the 
technology increasingly used by libraries to “check out” books is becoming controversial.  
Many university libraries are beginning to implement radio frequency identification 
(RFID), which uses an embedded electronic product code (EPC), a unique identifier.  The 
RFID tags, which can be read through a bag or coat, allow considerable data to be stored, 
such as the names of prior borrowers and their addresses.  See Paul Rubell, Wireless 
World: Libraries’ Use of RFID Tags Spurs Privacy, Legal Concerns, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 
2004, at 5; see also infra note 244 regarding library records and USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001). 
97 E-mail from Larry Simon, Member of Greenwich Board of Estimate and Taxation, to 
Ira Bloom, Professor of Political Science, Lehman College, City University of New York 
(Oct. 26, 2005, 06:24:00 EST) (on file with author).  
98 See id.  A survey conducted in the year 2000 revealed that only five percent of 
government websites showed some form of security policy and only seven percent had a 
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population of the municipality results in a greater size and number of 
databases in use. 
 
[32] Information in different databases can be cross-matched, making a 
valuable and potentially damaging trove of personal information about 
residents and families available to the public under FOILs.  Cross-
matching, by using the resident’s address, for example, as the common 
data element–a relatively easy task–would yield at low cost information 
which can be used for commercial or malevolent purposes.99  
 
B. POSTING DATABASES ON THE INTERNET 
 
[33]  As noted, a significant aspect of e-government is communication and 
activity using the Internet.100  Most state and local governments, even 
small jurisdictions, are placing policies, publications, and databases online 
and are greatly expanding the delivery of government services online for 
residents.101  In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, states 
and municipalities would be wise to establish policies for posting 
information and to rethink some of the web postings,102 particularly those 
potentially involving the lives and safety of their residents, including, for 
example, the location of key infrastructure systems.103  By contrast, at the 
                                                                                                                    
privacy policy.  Darrell M. West, Assessing E-Government: The Internet, Democracy, 
and Service Delivery by State and Federal Governments, Sept., 2000, 
http://www.insidepolitics.org/egovtreport00.html; see infra note 105 and accompanying 
text. 
99 Information in state and local databases can also be combined with other sources of 
information about residents.  A news report, whose source was the Center for Responsive 
Politics, reported upon campaign contributions to 527 groups ranging up to $500,000 by 
twenty Greenwich residents.  Such data provide a strong indicator of individual wealth.  
Neil Vigdor, Greenwich’s Deep Pockets Bankroll ‘527’ Groups, GREENWICH TIME, Oct. 
31, 2004, at A1 (reporting on Greenwich donors and 527s receiving the most money from 
Greenwich). 
100 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra note 62-63 and accompanying text.  
102 Even prior to September 11, the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA) cautioned: “When information is available over the Internet, such informal 
checks [practical obscurity] on data gathering no longer exist.” O'LOONEY, supra note 20, 
at 92. See also note 20 and accompanying text.   
103 The issue of public safety considerations as a basis for denial of a FOIA request, 
which possibly would lead to Internet posting, was raised by the town of Greenwich and 
rejected by the CT Freedom of Information Commission in the GIS case.  Whitaker v. 
Dir. Dep’t of Info. Tech., No. FIC2001-546 (F.I.C. C.T. 2002), available at 
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federal level the Homeland Security Act added a new Federal FOIA 
exemption for critical infrastructure.104   
 
[34]  Quite troubling, however, is that, even within local governments, 
decisions regarding the posting of information on agency internet web 
sites are often decentralized and are subject to limited oversight and 
control by elected officials, often surprising residents and their elected 
representatives.105  Once online, of course, all of the material is available 
                                                                                                                    
http://www.state.ct.us/foi/2002FD/20021113/FIC2001-546.htm.  The town is using the 
GIS as a key element in its planning for emergency operations.  Martin B. Cassidy, 
Town’s Digital Database Gets New Emergency Role, GREENWICH TIME, Aug. 6, 2004, at 
A3 (reporting that the GIS will be used to produce maps showing locations of fire 
hydrants, police cars, and fire trucks during emergencies).  The consequences of the 2002 
amendment of exemption nineteen of the Connecticut FOIA are unclear.  With the 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s continuing emphasis upon construing exemptions narrowly 
(see supra note 81 and accompanying text), it is not certain what degree of deference will 
be given to the findings of the Commissioner of Public Works.  See supra notes 91-92 
and accompanying text; infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
104 The Federal Government moved after September 11 to restrict access to critical 
infrastructure information, an action which was codified in the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1), (a)(1)(A) (2000), through the creation of 
an exemption to the Federal FOIA.  Although subject to criticism within Congress and by 
some FOIL advocates, the change is a rational response to current threats.  See Kristen 
Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post 9/11: Balancing the 
Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 
AM. U. L. REV. 261, 294, 296, 302-03 (2003). 
105 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, As Public Records Go Online, Some Say They’re Too Public, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at A1 (reporting upon new web site making New York City 
voter registration records, including home addresses, available on the web); Bruce 
Lambert, Online Trove of Property Data Is Raising Concerns in Nassau, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 27, 2002, at B6 (reporting upon the decision of the Chairman of the Nassau County 
Board of Assessors to place property data for every home and business, including color 
photographs, on the web and the reactions to this action); Jennifer Lee, Dirty Laundry, 
Online for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at G1 (describing decision of the clerk 
of courts for Hamilton County, Ohio to post county court records–including state tax 
liens, arrest warrants, bond postings, traffic infractions, etc–much to the chagrin of many 
residents); Joyce Purnick, A Homeowner And a Taste of Bureaucracy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
20, 2006, at B1 (describing difficulty of removing unfounded complaints from website of 
New York City Dept. Of Buildings). 
  
Court systems are one of the few venues in which these issues have been publicly 
debated.  Court systems have been addressing the issue of whether court filings should be 
made available electronically over the internet and the concomitant privacy issues.  See, 
e.g., Rules Change to Protect Privacy, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2003, at 7, available at 
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http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/dec03ttb/privacy/index.html (describing changes to Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure–Rules 1005, 1007, and 2002–requiring that cases no 
longer display filer’s entire social security number when case is viewed electronically); 
Electronic Access Available to Criminal Case Files, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office 
of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2004, at 5, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct04ttb/access/index.html (announcing that beginning Nov. 
1, 2004, federal criminal case file documents will also be available remotely through 
electronic access, but “[a]s with civil and bankruptcy cases, personal data identifiers 
[including social security and financial account numbers to the last four digits, dates of 
birth to the year, and home addresses to the city and state] must be redacted by the filer of 
a criminal case document, whether the document is filed electronically or in paper”).  
Some states, including Florida and Ohio, however, are backing away from online access 
to court records because of privacy concerns.  Callahan, supra note 73, at 6.  The public 
outcry in response to the Hamilton County clerk of courts actions, noted above, was in 
part responsible for the Ohio Supreme Court policy review.  The clerk of courts’ actions 
also resulted in a December 2004 Federal lawsuit against the County, alleging that 
information available on the website led to identity theft.  Id.   
 
For an informative discussion of the movement to internet access to court documents in 
the Federal judiciary and in the New York State Court system, see Arminda Bradford 
Bepko, Public Availability or Practical Obscurity: The Debate Over Public Access to 
Court Records on the Internet, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 967 (2005).  The author’s 
conclusion, however, that “[t]he First Amendment right to inspect court documents 
should be extended from the courthouse onto the internet regardless of the information 
contained within those documents,” is based upon faulty premises–including the failure 
to recognize the threat to privacy and to information safety posed by the postings, as well 
as the purported “voluntary” decision by a litigant to place personal information in court 
records.  Indeed, an argument can be made that these actions threaten a person’s 
Constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. at 982-983, 990. 
 
The Executive Branch of the Federal Government is recognizing some of these privacy 
concerns.  On September 26, 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued 
guidance on implementing privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002.  OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEM. NO. 03-22, 
OMB GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE E-GOVERNMENT 
ACT OF 2002 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-
22.html (providing regulations for The E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 
116 Stat. 2889 (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code)).  In accordance 
with the guidelines, agencies are directed to conduct Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) 
on information technology systems.  Among other issues, the PIAs are to analyze why the 
information is being collected, the parties with whom the information will be shared, and 
what opportunities people will have to decline to provide the information or to consent to 
particular uses.  See OMB Issues Guidance on Implementing Privacy Provisions of E-
Government Act, U.S. L. WK., Oct. 7, 2003, at 2188-2189. 
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to anyone, anywhere, with internet access, seven days a week, twenty-four 
hours a day.106  Web posting decisions are also controversial even among 
some FOIL advocates.   Interestingly, the Director of the New York State 
Committee on Open Government, a passionate advocate of public 
disclosure, questioned the “wisdom of putting . . . [the Nassau County 
assessments] up on a Web site for all to see.”107  This point of view is 
challenged, however, by other proponents of open records, including 
Charles Davis, executive director of the Freedom of Information Center at 
the Missouri School of Journalism, stating, “The greatest tool in the 
history of mankind toward promoting access is being turned into this 
demonic force for the invasion of privacy.  We’re equating ease of access 
with privacy, and to me they’re two different animals.  Either a record is 
private or it’s not.”108
 
[35]  The extensive use of large databases with personally identifiable 
information and their ease of manipulation also require the exercise of 
great care by public employees.  The possibility of inadvertently posting 
confidential records is an ever present threat, as illustrated by the 
experience of a school district in the State of Washington, which 
accidentally posted almost 7,000 confidential student records on its public 
internet website.109  In addition, what is made available may be more than 
                                               
106 The security risks of posting were demonstrated by the discovery by U.S. military 
forces in Iraq of diagrams and photographs of public schools in several states that had 
evidently been downloaded from government Web sites.  Eric Lichtblau, Iraq Disk 
Mentions U.S. Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at A18; Sean Cavanagh & Kathleen 
Kennedy Manzo, Districts Rethink Availability of Data on School Security, EDUC. WK., 
Oct. 20, 2004, at 18 (reporting upon discussions among school administrators about 
limiting access to school information on the internet following F.B.I. warnings and 
including copy of floor plans of a Pennsylvania elementary school found on the internet).    
107 Lambert, supra note 105.  Nevertheless, the Committee ruled against neighboring 
Suffolk County’s attempt to copyright its GIS system.  County of Suffolk v. First Am. 
Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 256-272 and 
accompanying text. 
108 Harmon, supra note 105.  The simplistic view that records are either public or private 
is considered in Section IV.B.2.  See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
109 Andrew Trotter, Confidential Records Mistakenly Posted on the Internet, EDUC. WK., 
Oct. 8, 2003, at 5 (reporting that records for all 6,916 students in grades 5-8 in 
Vancouver, Wash. School District were accidentally placed on District’s public web site).  
Privacy of student records is protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).  See infra note 178 and accompanying text; see also 
Error on Student Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 20 (reporting error made by 
Office of Financial Aid of the University of Kansas in which individual e-mail messages 
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intended because of technical and programming mistakes by information 
technology staff.110   
 
[36]  Security of governmental databases and concomitant unintentional 
disclosure of information as a consequence of hacking and other threats 
are additional concerns.111  In a rare example of attention to security 
breaches and in recognition of risks–including identity theft–created by 
widespread collection of personal information in the public and private 
sectors, California now requires that state agencies disclose breaches of 
security that lead to unauthorized access to personal information about 
California residents.112
 
III. FOILS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF DIGITAL INFORMATION:  
CREATING THE PROBLEM 
 
[37]  All fifty states have enacted FOILs, many doing so after the Federal 
Freedom of Information Act113 was enacted in 1966.114  A large majority 
of the state FOILs follow the open records approach of the federal 
                                                                                                                    
sent to 119 students were inadvertently sent to all, enabling each of the recipients to see 
the names of all of the students receiving the message).  
110 See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, Online Search Engines Lift Cover of Privacy, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 9, 2004, at 6 (describing how confidential data can turn up through internet search 
engines because of improperly configured servers, holes in security systems, and human 
error on the part of the entity holding the information). 
111 See, e.g., ASSEMBLYMAN JEFF KLEIN, CHAIR, NYS ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON 
OVERSIGHT, ANALYSIS AND INVESTIGATION, ANNUAL 2003 REPORT 9-11 (2003), 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Oversight/2003Annual (reporting upon lack of 
attention to information security by New York State agencies); Ellen Perlman, Breaking 
and Entering, CQ/GOVERNING, Oct. 2004, at 16 (describing the difficulties faced by state 
and local officials seeking to secure their networks).    
112 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2004).  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2004) 
applies similar requirements to people or businesses that conduct business in California.  
This statute recently forced a number to companies–including ChoicePoint, LexisNexis, 
Wachovia, and Ameritrade–to reveal substantial data security breaches.  Tom Zeller, Jr., 
The Scramble to Protect Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at C1. 
113 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  Twenty two additional states, 
including New York, added data breach laws during 2005.  Freedman, supra note 7.  For 
discussions of the New York State Information Security Breach and Notification Act, 
effective Dec. 7, 2005, see Mark G. Milone, Information Insecurity, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 
2005, at 5;  Stephen V, Treglia, I.D. Theft Notification, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15, 2005, at 5; 
Yair Y. Galil & Mauricio F. Paez, Strict Requirements, Harsh Penalties Mark State’s 
New Data Breach Act, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 2006, at S7. 
114 Nowadzky, supra note 11, at 65. 
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statute.115 A standard public administration text describes the purpose of 
FOILs: 
 
Holding government officials accountable for their actions 
and conduct is crucial to democratic government, even 
more so when substantial responsibility is entrusted to 
nonelected (administrative) personnel.  This rationale 
underlies the need for openness in government operations, 
public scrutiny, and freedom of information (FOI) and 
sunshine laws, all of which increase the public’s ability to 
inquire successfully into the activities of bureaucracy and 
other branches of government.116
 
The Federal FOIA includes an explicit exemption, exemption six, for 
“personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”117   
 
[38]  The New York and Connecticut FOILs are typical of the state FOILs 
in their scope and coverage.118   They differ from each other markedly, 
however, in some key aspects. 
 
A. NEW YORK STATE 
 
[39]  The New York State Freedom of Information Law–Article 6 of the 
Public Officers Law–was initially adopted in 1974.119  It declares: “The 
people’s right to know the process of governmental decision-making and 
to review the documents and statistics leading to determinations is basic to 
our society.  Access to such information should not be thwarted by 
shrouding it with the cloak of secrecy or confidentiality.”120  The New 
                                               
115 Id. at 65-66. 
116 MICHAEL E. MILAKOVICH & GEORGE J. GORDON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN 
AMERICA 51 (2001).  
117 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).  See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 35-56 (1973).  For a comprehensive 
summary of the legislative history and application of this provision, see generally 
LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS 125-161 (Harry A. Hammitt 
et al. eds., 2002).   
118 See Nowadzky, supra note 11, at 66 n.6. 
119 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 2004). 
120 Id. § 84 (emphasis added). 
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York FOIL also includes a provision seeking to prevent “unwarranted 
invasions of personal privacy,” which provides for “deletion of identifying 
details or withholding of records otherwise available.”121 An unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy includes, but is not limited to, six 
circumstances, including “sale or release of lists of names and addresses if 
such lists would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes.”122  As 
with other FOILs, the New York State courts have ruled that the FOIL is 
to be construed liberally and its exemptions interpreted narrowly.123   
 
[40]  New York state law includes two statutory provisions designed to 
protect the interests of people about whom New York State agencies have 
collected information: Article 6-A of the Public Officers Law–the 
Personal Privacy Protection Law124–and Article II of the State Technology 
Law–the Internet Security and Privacy Act.125  Both, however, include 
exceptions for requests made under the FOIL.126
 
[41]  Notwithstanding the judiciary’s emphasis on liberal construction of 
the statute and the narrow scope of the exemptions, a proper interpretation 
of the statute, when applied to agency-held databases, should lead to a 
greater protection of privacy.  The emphasis in the legislative declaration 
upon documents “leading to determinations,” combined with legislative 
concern manifested in the FOIL’s unwarranted invasion of privacy 
provision, should lead to the conclusion that agency databases maintained 
for convenience in administering programs, such as recreation 
management systems, and elements of programs, such as the names of 
owners of properties in GIS records and social security numbers of voters 
in voter registration lists, should not be made available in response to 
FOIL requests.  Increasingly, much of the information in these databases 
                                               
121 Id. § 89(2)(a). 
122 Id. § 89(2)(b)(iii). 
123 See, e.g., Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 518 N.E.2d 930, 932-33 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that 
records containing names and addresses of jurors exempted from disclosure by Judiciary 
Law); Prisoners’ Legal Services v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 535 N.E.2d 243, 246 
(N.Y. 1988) (holding that personnel records of corrections officers exempted from 
disclosure by Civil Rights Law § 50-a). 
124 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 2004).  
125 N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW §§ 201-207 (McKinney 2002).  
126 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 96(1)(c) (McKinney 2004) (exempting FOIL requests from the 
Personal Privacy Protection Law); NY. STATE TECH.  § 207 (McKinney 2002) 
(exempting FOIL requests from the Internet Security and Privacy Act). 
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is maintained for convenience and efficiency in the administration of 
programs and is never presented to public officials for the purpose of 
making determinations of public policy.  Consequently, the New York 
state courts should reexamine their decisions regarding the FOIL in the 
light of the intent of the statute and the technological inversion that has 
occurred. 
 
[42]  Perhaps surprisingly, the New York State Committee on Open 
Government, the agency charged with administering New York State’s 
FOIL,127 is recognizing cautiously the increasing importance of security 
and privacy issues since September 11, 2001, particularly as it affects the 
lives and safety of people.  At the October 2003 Committee meeting, 
Robert Freeman, Executive Director of the Committee, “indicated that 
following Sept. 11 there is an increased need for security which has 
caused ‘some variations on issues,’ but that, ‘in general . . . FOIL does not 
need to be amended in New York.’”128
 
[43]  Even more surprising is the concern of the Committee regarding 
personal privacy issues, particularly as they encompass the Internet.  The 
Committee acknowledged that the Internet poses “an additional problem 
by removing traditional barriers to obtaining information about individuals 
and underscoring the need for consideration before agencies post such 
information on web sites.”129  Executive Director Freeman cautioned: 
“Issues involving privacy are difficult and inconsistent . . . . In other 
words, you better think first.”130  Unfortunately, the concerns of the 
Committee do not yet appear to have significantly impacted either agency 
behavior or the Committee’s own actions.131
                                               
127 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(1)-(2) (McKinney 2004).  
128 Dakotah Pratt-Hewitt, Open Government Group Seeks Amendment to Force 
Payments, THE LEGISLATIVE GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2003, at 2. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See Lambert, supra note 105, and accompanying text.  See also Investigation Tech. v. 
Horn, 4 Misc. 3d 1023A (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (supporting rejection by New York City of 
FOIL request for dates of birth of detainees–including many arrested but not convicted–
held in New York City jails by web business that compiles criminal records for 
background checks).  In Investigation Technologies, the Committee on Open Government 
gave insufficient weight to the unwarranted invasion of personal privacy provision, 
particularly the provision regarding release of lists for commercial purposes.  Id.; N.Y. 
PUB. OFF. LAW § 89(2)(b)(iii) (Consol. 2005).  Although there is considerable opinion 
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B. CONNECTICUT 
 
[44]  The Connecticut Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)132 presents 
consequential differences from the New York FOIL.133  Enacted initially 
in 1963 and lacking a statutory statement of purpose, the FOIA begins 
with a set of encompassing definitions.134  It defines “public records or 
files” as “any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the 
public’s business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public 
agency . . . whether such data or information be handwritten, typed, tape-
recorded, printed, photostated, photographed or recorded by any other 
method.”135  The Connecticut FOIA does not require the connection to 
official decision making invoked by the New York FOIL, and thus 
exposes more databases with personally identifiable information to public 
disclosure.136
 
[45]  The Connecticut FOIA includes a lengthy set of twenty categories of 
exempt records,137 which is nevertheless less protective of privacy than 
the New York FOIL exemptions.138  The only reference to “disclosure . . . 
which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy”139 is included in 
the second of the exemptions and is drafted in a narrow manner to refer to 
“personnel or medical files and similar files.”140   This reference also 
includes a provision, initially enacted in 1995 and since added to, 
providing for the nondisclosure of residential addresses of certain 
individuals, inter alia, judges and police officers.141  In addition, a 
provision was amended in 2002 to extend the public safety exemption 
included in subsection nineteen.142    
                                                                                                                    
that the purpose of a FOIL request is irrelevant, see, e.g., In re Capital Newspapers v. 
Burns, 67 N.Y. 2d 562, 567 (1986), in this instance, the statute itself makes it relevant.   
132 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200 (2005). 
133 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 88 (Consol. 1999). 
134 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200. 
135 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200(5) (2005). 
136 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200; N.Y. PUB. O. LAW § 88 (Consol. 1999). 
137 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(1)-(20) (2005). 
138 See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 88 (Consol. 1999). 
139 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(2). 
140 Id. 
141 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-217(a) (2005). 
142 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(19).  Section 1-210(b)(19) provides, in pertinent part, 
for exemption from disclosure as follows: 
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[46]  The FOIA fails to recognize the consequences of digital technology 
by explicitly providing that nonexempt records maintained in a “computer 
storage system” shall be provided to a requestor in the “electronic storage 
device or medium requested by the person.”143  A Freedom of Information 
Commission is established to administer the FOIA.144  
 
[47]  As in most states, the Connecticut courts have ruled that the “policy 
underlying the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) favor[s] the disclosure 
of public records”145 and that “any exception to that rule will be narrowly 
construed in light of the general policy of openness expressed in the 
[act].”146  Nevertheless, there is at least one decision cautioning that a 
“balance” between governmental needs for privacy and the public’s right 
to know must govern the application and interpretation of the FOIA.147  It 
is significant, however, that the decision refers to the government’s, not 
the individual’s, need for privacy.148
 
                                                                                                                    
Records when there are reasonable grounds to believe disclosure may 
result in a safety risk, including the risk of harm to any person, any 
government-owned or leased institution or facility. . . . Such reasonable 
grounds shall be determined . . . with respect to records concerning any 
executive branch agency or the state or any municipal, district, or 
regional agency, by the Commissioner of Public Works, after 
consultation with the chief executive officer of the agency.   
Id.  This provision was applied in an ambiguous manner by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court in Director, Department of Information Technology v. Freedom of Information 
Commission, 874 A.2d 785 (Conn. 2005).  See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
143 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-211(a) (2005). 
144 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (2005). 
145 Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 609 A.2d 998, 1000 (Conn. 
1992) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that, in keeping with policy of FOIA 
favoring disclosure and requiring that exceptions to disclosure be narrowly construed, 
city police department did not satisfy burden of “proving municipal permits to carry 
pistols were ‘similar’ to exempt medical and personnel files”).      
146 Dir., Dep’t of Info. Tech. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 874 A.2d 785, 791 (Conn. 
2005).  See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
147 Wilson v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 435 A.2d 353, 357 (Conn. 1980) (holding that 
state university program review committee documents were predecisional and 
university’s reasons for refusing disclosure were sufficient to justify withholding 
documents). 
148 Id. 
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[48]  Neither the Connecticut Legislature nor the Freedom of Information 
Commission appears to have recognized the consequences of the 
technological inversion that has occurred as a consequence of digital 
technologies and the Internet.  The Connecticut Supreme Court in its 
decision in Director, Department of Information Technology v. Freedom 
of Information Commission, also demonstrated a profound lack of 
understanding of the consequences of the new technologies.149  
 
C. SALE OF INFORMATION 
 
[49]  Even more disconcerting, perhaps, than the approach to 
administering the FOILs and the posting of information on websites is the 
sale of government databases.  Some state and local governments have 
sought to reap economic benefit from their databases by selling them 
commercially.150  Often, these sales take place without public knowledge, 
sometimes creating a backlash.  One example is the sale of state motor 
vehicle records by some states.151  In 1989, Rebecca Shaeffer, an actress, 
was murdered by a “fan” who learned her home address from a private 
investigator who had obtained it from California motor vehicle records. 152  
Ms. Schaeffer’s murder spurred Congress to enact the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act.153  The Act prohibits, with some exceptions, state motor 
vehicle departments from making available to any person or entity 
personal information about any individual.154  The Act survived a 
                                               
149 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d 785.  See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying 
text. 
150 BARRETT & GREENE, supra note 20, at 173.    
151 See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation makes approximately eight million dollars each year from 
the sale of motor vehicle information); Dan Christensen, Driven to Sue: Suits in West 
Palm Beach Allege Personal Information On State’s 13 Million Drivers Being Sold 
Unlawfully, BROWARD DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, June 24, 2003, at 1 (explaining that 
state of Florida did not sell data but named in suit). 
152 Margan v. Niles, 250 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (N.D. N.Y. 2003) (citing 139 Cong. Rec. 
S15745-01, S15765, S15762, S15761-66 (1993); 145 Cong. Rec. S14533-02, S14538 
(1999)); see infra note 163; see also John Caher, Municipalities May Be Liable Under 
Privacy Law for Drivers, N.Y. L.J., March 20, 2003, at 1. 
153 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000); Margan, 
250 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69.    
154 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1). 
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constitutional challenge by South Carolina in the United States Supreme 
Court.155   
 
[50]  Notwithstanding the Act and the United States Supreme Court 
decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court has continued to support FOIL 
requests for motor vehicle data by giving a crabbed, narrow construction 
to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.  For purposes of implementing a 
personal property tax on automobiles, Connecticut statutes require that the 
Motor Vehicle Commissioner furnish town tax assessors with a list of 
names and addresses of owners of motor vehicles “using the records of the 
Department of Motor Vehicles.”156  For example, in Davis v. Freedom of 
Information Commission, an insurance investigator sought to examine the 
motor vehicle grand list books of the City of Bridgeport, and the tax 
assessor’s office denied the request. 157  The Connecticut Freedom of 
Information Commission ordered the City to provide access to the motor 
vehicle grand list books.158  The tax assessor challenged the Commission’s 
decision.159  The Commission’s decision was upheld by both the Superior 
Court160  and the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which adopted the 
opinion of the Superior Court. 161  The Superior Court reasoned that, 
although the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act “regulates the disclosure of 
personal information contained in the records of motor vehicle 
departments,”162 by permitting disclosure of the information to other 
governmental agencies for use in carrying out their functions, those 
records, when transferred, lost their protected status.163   
 
                                               
155 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  
156 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-163 (1999 & Supp. 2005).  
157 Davis v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 790 A.2d 1188, 1190 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1194. 
161 Davis v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 787 A.2d 530, 536-37 (Conn. 2002). 
162 Davis, 790 A.2d at 1192 (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000)). 
163 Davis, 790 A.2d at 1192-93 (emphasis added).  A contrary view of the scope and 
reach of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act was expressed by a U.S. District Judge in 
New York who ruled that a town could be held vicariously liable for violation of the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act because one of its police officers improperly “ran” 
license plate numbers and obtained information about plaintiffs from the New York 
Statewide Police Information Network.  Margan v. Niles, 250 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66, 72-75 
(N.D. N.Y. 2003).        
 36 
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 3 
 
[51]  Through their somewhat tortured and circular reasoning,164 the 
Connecticut courts gave greater weight to the literal provisions of the 
Connecticut FOIA than to the federal statute that had been upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the face of constitutional challenge,165 thus 
ignoring the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.166  It has been 
clear, of course, at least since Ableman v. Booth,167 that state courts cannot 
condone a violation of federal law.168  In Davis, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, in an effort to avoid weakening the Connecticut FOIA, effectively 
undermined Congress’ attempt to protect the privacy of residents’ motor 
vehicle information.169  Yet, as in the town of Greenwich GIS case,170 it is 
difficult to understand how Davis171 advances the underlying purposes of 
a FOIL.  Both decisions ignore the information privacy interests of 
residents. 
 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
 
[52]  Solutions available to protect information privacy include legislative 
amendments to FOILs and aggressive assertion of federal statutory and 
Constitutional remedies by residents and local governments.  As a policy 
matter, it would be far preferable for state legislatures to address these 
issues rather than to place the burden upon individual local governments 
and individual residents.  
 
A. STATE LEGISLATURES 
 
[53]  Although some piecemeal bills have been introduced in state 
legislatures to address aspects of the impact of FOILs upon information 
                                               
164 The Department of Motor Vehicles was required by State law to transfer the 
information.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-163 (2004). 
165 See Condon, 528 U.S. at 148-51 (holding that the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 
1994 did not violate federalism principles and was a proper exercise of commerce power 
by Congress). 
166 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
167 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). 
168 See id. at 525-26 (rejecting the authority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court to refuse to 
adhere to the Federal Fugitive Slave Act). 
169 Davis, 787 A.2d at 536-37 (affirming and incorporating the Connecticut Superior 
Court decision); see Davis, 790 A.2d 1188.   
170 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech., 874 A.2d at 785. 
171 Davis, 790 A.2d 1188. 
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privacy,172 there is little evidence of any desire to address these issues in a 
comprehensive manner.    
 
[54]  State legislative proposals for restrictions upon availability of 
information are fought ardently by “good government” organizations and 
FOIL advocates.  Characterizing the reaction as “ideological drift,” 
Professor Daniel Solove, citing Professor Jack M. Balkin, writes:   
Ideological drift in law means that legal ideas and symbols will change 
their political valence as they are used over and over again in new 
contexts.  Laws fostering transparency are justified as shedding light into 
the dark labyrinths of government bureaucracy to expose its inner 
workings to public scrutiny…. However, sunshine laws are increasingly 
becoming a tool for powerful corporations to collect information about 
individuals to further their own commercial interests, not to shed light on 
the government.  A window to look in on the government is transforming 
into a window for the government and allied private sector entities to peer 
in on individuals.173
Whether state legislatures come to recognize the ideological drift will be 
crucial to the information privacy of residents. 
 
B. RESIDENTS 
 
[55]  What legal options are available to residents who wish to avoid 
having personally identifiable information about them disseminated in 
electronic format by agencies in response to FOIL requests?  In order to 
trump state FOIL laws, either federal statutes or Constitutional remedies 
                                               
172 See, e.g., An Act Concerning the Disclosure of Geographic Information System Data, 
H.B. 5014, 2003 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2003) (proposing to exempt from 
Connecticut FOIA disclosure all GIS data that concerns private residences and 
buildings); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-217(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (providing for 
nondisclosure of residential addresses of judges, police officers, and certain other 
specified officials and enacted in 1995); see also, Tobin A. Coleman, Changes proposed 
for Sunshine Law, Greenwich Time, Mar. 18, 2006, at A1 (reporting upon several 
proposed changes to the Connecticut FOIA under consideration in the State Legislature, 
with limited likelihood that any of the proposals will be enacted into law). 
173 Solove, supra note 14, at 1197 (internal citations omitted).  But see Investigation 
Tech. v. Horn, 798 N.Y.S.2d 345, 345 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying Investigation 
Technologies’ application compelling the New York City Department of Corrections to 
disclose birthdates of all detainees). 
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must be invoked.174  First, in order to invoke any of the remedies 
available, the resident must know of the potential release of the 
information.175  The arguments made in this section lead to the conclusion 
that residents may have to be notified about pending FOIL requests 
involving their personally identifiable information.176
 
1. STATUTORY REMEDIES 
 
[56]  The few available federal statutory remedies regulating records held 
by state and local governments address narrow strands of information.  
                                               
174 Neither the New York nor the Connecticut state constitution has been interpreted to 
provide protection for information privacy.  See, e.g., Pane v. City of Danbury, 841 A.2d 
684, 691-94 (Conn. 2004) (finding neither Constitutional nor statutory claims for 
invasion of privacy based upon improper disclosure of information by city under 
Connecticut FOIA). 
175 Most often, residents do not know about a request for data that includes them.  Some 
FOILs include provisions precluding the release of information about certain groups of 
people.  See, e.g., supra notes 141 and 163 and accompanying text.  It is unlikely that an 
agency, when responding to a request for a large database, actually redacts specific 
information about certain groups of people in the database, particularly when the agency 
may not be aware, without canvassing the data subjects, that particular people fall within 
the protected group.  See Liptak, supra note 44, at A12 (regarding the publication of 
information about Washington State police).  In contrast, the OMB Memorandum 
regarding the conduct of Privacy Impact Assessments at least asks agencies to analyze 
and describe how people will have the opportunity to consent to particular uses of the 
information.  See OMB Memorandum, supra note 105, at 2188.  This is perhaps belated 
recognition of the recommendation made by the Department of Health, Education & 
Welfare in 1973:   
[W]e recommend that the Freedom of Information Act be amended to 
require an agency to obtain the consent of an individual before 
disclosing in personally identifiable form exempted-category data about 
him, unless the disclosure is within the purposes of the system as 
specifically required by statute.  Pending such amendment of the Act, 
we further recommend that all Federal agencies provide for obtaining 
the consent of individuals before disclosing exempted-category 
personal data about them under the Freedom of Information Act.   
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 23 at 65-66, available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm (follow “IV. 
Recommended Safeguards for Administrative Personal Data Systems” 
hyperlink).  
176 If a large database is the subject of the request, the notification could be by publication 
or other mechanism for providing general notice to the public.  See, e.g., CALIF. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.29(g) (West Supp. 2005) (listing a variety of mechanisms to provide notice 
to those affected by state agency breaches of information security).  
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These statutes include the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act,177  the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act,178 and Section 7 of the Privacy 
Act.179   
 
[57]  Section 7(a) of the Privacy Act provides substantial privacy 
protection for residents’ social security numbers by making it “unlawful 
for any Federal, State, or local government agency to deny to any 
individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such 
individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account number.”180      
 
[58]  In addition, requests for a resident’s social security number must 
include the following notice: 
 
Any Federal, State, or local government agency which 
requests an individual to disclose his social security 
account number shall inform that individual whether that 
disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or 
other authority such number is solicited, and what uses will 
be made of it.181
 
A court of appeals decision determined that Section 7 confers a private 
right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §1983,182 thus providing potent 
                                               
177 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. 
178 Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(g) (1990 & 
Supp. 1991) (addressing student records in schools and colleges).  For a thorough 
discussion of laws and regulations affecting privacy of student information, see 
NATIONAL FORUM ON EDUCATION STATISTICS, FORUM GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE 
PRIVACY OF STUDENT INFORMATION: STATE AND LOCAL EDUCATION AGENCIES (2004). 
179 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909 (1974). 
180 § 7(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 1909. 
181 § 7(b), 88 Stat. at 1909. 
182 Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (challenging Georgia voter 
registration procedures requiring voters to disclose social security numbers). 
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protection, with some exceptions,183 from disclosure of a resident’s social 
security number sought for burgeoning e-government databases.184   
 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
 
[59]  The most effective legal instrument for preventing disclosure of most 
personally identifiable information is the United States Constitution.  The 
privacy spotlight should be on the prevention of disclosure, particularly 
the disclosure in digital format, of information in state and local 
government databases rather than upon preventing the collection of that 
information.  From a practical standpoint, it will be next to impossible to 
halt the expansion of e-government and the concomitant collection of 
information about residents in databases.185  Consequently, the 
constitutional focus should address curtailing the copying and 
dissemination requirements of FOILs, particularly the copying in 
electronic, digital format.      
                                               
183 Section 7 of the Privacy Act does not apply to a disclosure required by federal statute 
or disclosure for a system of records in operation before January 1, 1975, which then 
required a social security number to identify an individual. § 7(a)(2)(B), 88 Stat. at 1909.  
In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 authorized states to use social security numbers 
only “in the administration of any tax, general public assistance, driver’s license, or 
motor vehicle registration.”  42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i) (2003). 
184 The Supreme Court has ruled that 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A), which makes the federal 
government liable under Section 3 of the Privacy Act for actual damages, requires proof 
of some actual damages to recover the $1,000 minimum statutory damages.  Doe v. Chao, 
540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
 In addition, remedies may exist under state law.  In an interesting decision, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, in response to a certified question from the United 
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, held that:  
[W]hile a SSN [social security number] must be disclosed in certain 
circumstances, a person may reasonably expect that the number will 
remain private . . . .  Accordingly, a person whose SSN is obtained by 
an investigator from a credit reporting agency without the person’s 
knowledge or permission may have a cause of action for intrusion upon 
seclusion for damages caused by the sale of the SSN, but must prove 
that the intrusion was such that it would have been offensive to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities.  
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008-1009 (N.H. 2003).  The sale of the 
social security number and later her workplace address by an internet-based investigation 
service had led to the killing of the plaintiff’s twenty-year-old daughter at her workplace.  
See, e.g., John Riley, Legal Heat for Detective Ruse: Technique Helped a Stalker to Kill, 
NEWSDAY, March 16, 2003, at A8; O’HARROW, supra note 5, at 148-149.    
185 See supra Part II.A. 
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[60]  The source of the constitutional right to information privacy derives 
from a combination of the Fourth Amendment and the liberty interest of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.186  The delineation of 
constitutional rights involved is now at a nascent stage similar to that 
which faced the United States Supreme Court in 1928 when it considered 
the Fourth Amendment privacy issues created by the telephone in the case 
of Olmstead v. United States.187  The place of the telephone in United 
States society was evolving rapidly in the late 1920s, and Fourth 
Amendment doctrine was facing challenges from both technological 
inversion and ideological drift.  Although the Court’s five-to-four decision 
held that an off-premises wiretap was not a search, 188 the majority opinion 
failed to appreciate the impact of the telephone.  Justice Brandeis, writing 
for the dissent, wrote with a Jeffersonian sense of future developments:  
 
But time works changes, brings into existence new 
conditions and purposes.  Subtler and more far-reaching 
means of invading privacy have become available to the 
government . . . .  Moreover, in the application of a 
Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has 
been, but of what may be.189
 
[61]  It took another thirty-nine years for a majority of the Court to 
recognize the changes wrought by the telephone.  In Katz v. United 
States,190 the Court held that a bug placed on top of a glass public 
telephone booth was a search because the bug constituted the “uninvited 
ear” from which United States citizens are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.191  In today’s world, the combination of technological 
inversion and the rapid advances in digitalizing public administration 
create a similar situation to that of Katz, in which FOIL laws are leading to 
an invasion of the Americans’ constitutional right to privacy in their 
personal information. 
 
                                               
186 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, XIV. 
187 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
188 Id. at 464. 
189 Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
190 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
191 Id. at 352. 
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[62]  The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy 
in personal information, which has been applied in different contexts by 
several United States Courts of Appeals.  “One element of privacy has 
been characterized as ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.’”192 Personal information is recognized as included 
within the concept of personal matters.  In Whalen v. Roe,193 the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a New York law that required physicians to 
report certain drug prescriptions to the state in part because of privacy 
protections included within the statutory scheme.  The Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government 
files.  The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare 
and social security benefits, the supervision of public 
health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the 
enforcement of criminal laws all require the orderly 
preservation of great quantities of information, much of 
which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing 
or harmful if disclosed.  The right to collect and use such 
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a 
concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures.  Recognizing that in some 
circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the 
Constitution, nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, 
and its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a 
proper concern with, and protection of, the individual’s 
interest in privacy.194
 
[63]  The Supreme Court has also explicitly recognized the distinction 
between individual public records, which are subject to public view but 
                                               
192 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 599 (1977)) (rejecting claim of presidential privilege and upholding 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 after weighing former 
President Nixon’s privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters against 
governmental interest expressed in the Act).  
193 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
194 Id. at 605 (emphasis added). 
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protected by practical obscurity,195 and public records in a compilation.  In 
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press,196 the Court denied a Federal FOIA request for an FBI “rap 
sheet,” a compilation of scattered criminal records, by invoking a 
somewhat labored interpretation of the Federal FOIA to avoid the need to 
address the constitutional issues potentially involved in the case.197  The 
Court in Reporters Committee restated one of the Whalen principles as 
follows:  “[O]ur cases have also recognized the privacy interest inherent in 
the nondisclosure of certain information even where the information may 
have been at one time public.”198   The Court then elaborated:  “[w]e have 
also recognized the privacy interest in keeping personal facts away from 
the public eye.”199  
 
[64]  One commentator has analyzed which types of information implicate 
informational privacy interests: 
 
The extent to which specific types of information implicate 
privacy often may be a by-product of two interrelated 
factors:  the intrinsic and consequential features of the 
information.  Intrinsic features involve the degree of 
intimacy of the information.  Consequential features 
involve the potential for harm to the subject if the 
information is disclosed.  Information may not be intimate 
and yet may be considered “highly personal” by a 
reasonable person because of the fear that the disclosure 
would bring harmful or embarrassing consequences.200
 
Another commentator has discussed the consequences of not recognizing 
the privacy implications of “personal” information: 
 
The creeping loss of privacy that arises from narrowly 
defining personal information and exempting public 
information from protection calls for a reevaluation of U.S. 
                                               
195 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
196 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
197 Id. at 762, n.13. 
198 Id. at 767; see also comment of Mr. Davis, supra note 108 and accompanying text.    
199 Id. at 769. 
200 Richard C. Turkington & Anita L. Allen, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 384 
(1999). 
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policy toward public information.  The need for personal 
information to be “public information” must be identified 
clearly and narrowly.  This reduces the erosion of public 
and private distinctions and the corresponding loss of 
citizen privacy.  At the same time, the use of public 
information should be restricted to the purpose for which 
the personal information was made public.  Such a policy 
promotes basic fairness in the treatment of personal 
information and minimizes the adverse impact on privacy 
without compromising the objectives of open 
government.201
 
[65]  The FOILs’ requirements for disclosing and copying of government-
held information embody values of transparency in government decision 
making and integrity in government administration.  These interests 
should be weighed against constitutional rights involving personal 
liberties, including the constitutional right to privacy of personal 
information (information privacy), which was built upon “the right to be 
let alone.”202  In defining the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, the 
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States203 asked whether a person has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in an invaded place.204   The Court 
elaborated in a later case by explaining that the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment protection extends where the citizen has manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation is one that society 
accepts as objectively reasonable.205   
                                               
201 Joel R. Reidenberg, International Approaches to Public and Private Sector Data 
Privacy and Security, in A LITTLE KNOWLEDGEE: PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC 
INFORMATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 100 (Peter M. Shane, John Podesta, & Richard C. 
Leone eds., 2004).  The Chief of the Office of Privacy Protection of the California 
Department of Consumer Affairs, commenting about the increasing concerns about 
identity theft, stated:  “The role played by public records containing Social Security 
numbers and other sensitive personal information is critical.  It’s time to reconsider how 
we can keep an eye on government without spying on individual citizens and without 
exposing them to the risk of identity theft.”  Yuill, supra note 19, at 2430.  See infra note 
208 and accompanying text regarding the prevalence of identity theft.   
202 See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text. 
203 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
204 Id. at 353. 
205 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of 
garbage bags left at curb violates Fourth Amendment only if there is subjective 
 45 
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 3 
 
 
[66]  The increasing reliance upon and importance of personally 
identifiable information in essence creates and defines a “virtual person,” 
described by one commentator as a “digital persona” that approximates 
personality. 206  “[T]he digital persona is a model of an individual’s public 
personality based on data and maintained by transactions, and intended for 
use as a proxy for the individual.”207  A person cannot function normally 
in today’s United States without a social security number, driver’s license, 
bank accounts, credit and debit cards, etc.  It is also virtually impossible 
for a person to function if his or her personally identifiable information is 
widely disseminated to others, creating the opportunity for identity theft, 
which is perhaps the fastest growing crime in the United States.208   
Business and commerce have recognized the value of information about 
people in many contexts, and corporations go to great lengths to acquire 
such information, often, as already noted, from public agency 
databases.209  The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
personally identifiable information is a valuable article of  commerce.210  
 
[67]  Consequently, individual constitutional privacy rights should now 
encompass the virtual person or digital persona.  A United States Court of 
Appeals decision stated that the Supreme Court has recognized a right to 
                                                                                                                    
expectation of privacy that society finds objectively reasonable, but finding no violation 
in these circumstances) . 
206 Roger Clarke, The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data Surveillance, THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY, 10(2), *2 (1994), available at 
http://www.anu.edu/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DigPersona.html.  
207 Id. 
208 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft 
Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001) (discussing scope of and consequences to victims of 
identity theft).  The Federal Trade Commission collects statistics regarding the incidence 
of identity theft.  Federal Trade Commission: Your National Resource About ID Theft, 
available at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/id_federal.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005);  
see also Senator Maria Cantwell: Fighting Identity Theft, 
http://cantwell.senate.gov/issues/ID/statistics.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (identity 
theft statistics collected from several sources by U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell);  Yuill, 
supra note 19.    
209 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, 
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004) (proposing a 
model of propertized personal information that would respond to privacy concerns). 
210 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  
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confidentiality, 211 a subset of “the right to be let alone,” originally 
observed by Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent:  
 
They [the makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against 
the Government, the right to be let alone–the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.212   
 
Given the increasing importance of the new virtual person, the Katz test213 
should be applicable to the government’s control and dissemination of 
personally identifiable information.  Although the government may extract 
information from a resident for a valid purpose, a Katz expectation of 
privacy may nonetheless exist with respect to the information unwillingly 
surrendered to the government.  The propriety of the government seizing 
personal information is based in part upon the government’s purpose and 
the use made of the information.  A valid intrusion by the government, 
however, may become unjustifiable when it escapes its original purpose.  
When the government publishes validly obtained information, it 
nevertheless may intrude upon a subjective expectation of privacy on the 
part of the resident that society would accept as reasonable.  It violates the 
Katz test by misusing the information, thus breaching the right to 
informational privacy.214  
 
[68]  The potential consequences of the availability from government 
entities of personally identifiable information also affect the liberty 
                                               
211 Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994). 
212 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
213 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
214 The circumstances are analogous to other situations in which the government validly 
collects information for one purpose and then seeks to use it for other purposes.  See, e.g., 
D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 455 (2001) (examining the constitutionality of taking, analyzing, storing, and 
using DNA samples and data from arrested persons).  The author’s discussion of “special 
needs” searches is particularly relevant.  Id. at 489-98.  See also, Monica R. Shah, Note, 
The Case for a Statutory Suppression Remedy to Regulate Illegal Private Party Searches 
in Cyberspace, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 250 (2005) (questioning the admissibility of criminal 
evidence acquired by private-citizen hackers and turned over to the police).  
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interest of preserving the privacy of personal information.  Building upon 
the Supreme Court decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,215 Ingraham v. 
Wright,216 Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health,217 and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,218 the Sixth Circuit 
found that: 
 
Individuals have a clearly established right under the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause to 
personal security and to bodily integrity, and this right is 
fundamental where the magnitude of the liberty deprivation 
that the abuse inflicts upon the victim . . . strips the very 
essence of personhood.219
 
As a consequence, the Sixth Circuit “found that the [City of Columbus 
undercover police] officers have a fundamental constitutional interest in 
preventing the release of personal information contained in their personnel 
files where such disclosure creates a substantial risk of serious bodily 
harm,”220 and, consequently, that the City must demonstrate that its 
“actions narrowly serve a compelling public purpose.”221   
                                               
215 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that there are “privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”). 
216 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (recognizing the “right to be free from 
… unjustified intrusions on personal security”).  
217 Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“acknowledging that a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in refusing unwanted medical treatment” (quoting Kallstrom v. City of 
Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1062 (6th Cir. 1998))). 
218 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) 
(“stating that the right to an abortion reflects respect for ‘personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity’” (quoting Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062)). 
219 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062-63 (internal quotations omitted). 
220 Id. at 1064.  The personal information included, among other information, the officers’ 
addresses, telephone numbers, copies of their drivers’ licenses, and immediate family 
members’ names, addresses and telephone numbers.  Id. at 1059. 
221 Id.; cf. Liptak, supra note 44 (describing the experience of Washington State police 
officers).  The threat to personal security often applies to people outside of the law 
enforcement field and may be quite unpredictable.  See text accompanying supra note 
152 (discussing the murder of actress Rebecca Shaeffer); supra note 166 (discussing the 
workplace murder of Ms. Remsburg’s daughter).  See also supra note 142 and 
accompanying text (identifying the exemption in the Connecticut FOIA for residential 
addresses of public officials, including judges and police officers, a legislative 
recognition that the release of addresses places these officials in jeopardy).     
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[69]  Another important element of the Kallstrom case is the issue of 
notice to those affected by the release of information.  Although the Ohio 
Public Records Act222 did not require notice to affected people prior to the 
release of information, the Sixth Circuit found a constitutional requirement 
for prior notice in this case under the procedural due process component of 
the Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
The procedural component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, however, at a minimum requires that 
the City notify the officers of a request for their addresses, 
phone numbers, and driver’s licenses, and the names, 
addresses, and phone numbers of their family, prior to 
releasing this information so that they may have the 
opportunity to invoke their constitutionally protected rights 
to privacy and personal security.223
 
The right to privacy in personal information is affected crucially by the 
purposes for and methods by which governments obtain personally 
identifiable information from their residents.  Several purposes for 
governmental collection of information can be differentiated: supporting 
the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right (i.e., voting and jury 
service), fulfilling obligations created by the government (i.e., paying 
taxes, compulsory school attendance, and filing land records), satisfying 
requirements essential to one’s livelihood (i.e., professional and business 
licenses, drivers’ licenses), and seeking access to services provided by the 
government (i.e., libraries, parks, public universities, and public hospitals).  
The virtual person’s right to be let alone is particularly compelling when 
the government has forced disgorgement of the personally identifiable 
information into an electronic database (as is the case in most programs 
today) and then seeks to distribute it broadly, most often without notice to 
the affected residents.224  “[W]hen the information is in the Government’s 
control as a compilation, rather than a record of ‘what the Government is 
up to,’ the privacy interest . . . is in fact at its apex, while the FOIA-based 
                                               
222 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 1997). 
223 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1067. 
224 See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1345 (4th Cir. 1993); see also infra notes 
229-31 and accompanying text. 
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public interest in disclosure is at its nadir.”225  Both the Whalen and 
Reporters Committee decisions emphasize, in the words of Whalen, that 
“[t]he right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures. . . . [I]n some circumstances that duty arguably 
has its roots in the Constitution . . . .”226  The standard of review or degree 
of scrutiny applicable to the government’s actions and the weight given to 
the government’s interests, as well as the reasonableness of an expectation 
of privacy, vary depending upon the governmental purpose involved in the 
data collection and maintenance. 
 
A. STRICT SCRUTINY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
[70]   “Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held 
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling 
state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to 
express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”227  In other words, 
strict scrutiny must be applied.  If the disclosure of personal information is 
required as a condition of the exercise of a fundamental right, such as the 
right to vote or the right to serve on a jury, then strict scrutiny should be 
applied to the state’s desire to disclose and make this information 
available in electronic format to the public.228  Similarly, if the failure to 
provide information required to fulfill obligations mandated by the 
government, such as paying taxes and attending school, will result in 
sanctions such as the deprivation of liberty, then strict scrutiny should also 
be applied to the state’s desire to disclose and make this information 
available in electronic format to the public.   
 
                                               
225 United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 780 (1989) (emphasis added) (referring to Federal FOIA exemption 7(c), but 
applicable as well to the constitutional issue). 
226 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (emphases added); see Reporters Comm., 
489 U.S. 749. 
227 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted). 
228 The “fundamental right of access to the courts,” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
533-34 (2004), and the concomitant impact of the availability of court filings in 
electronic format on the Internet are beyond the scope of this article.  The latter is, 
however, a topic of lively debate.  See supra note 105. 
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[71]  In Greidinger v. Davis,229 the Fourth Circuit ruled that conditioning 
the right to vote upon a citizen making available his or her social security 
number, which then became subject to public disclosure, “compel[led] a 
would-be voter in Virginia to consent to the possibility of a profound 
invasion of privacy when exercising the fundamental right to vote.”230  
The Fourth Circuit concluded that “it creates an intolerable burden on that 
right as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”231
 
[72]  Strict scrutiny has also been found applicable when the release of 
personal information contained in personnel files creates a “substantial 
risk of serious bodily harm,”232 As already noted, the threat of substantial 
risk of bodily harm may apply to people not in the law enforcement 
enterprise.233  Consequently, the release of other records, such as motor 
vehicle records and even GIS records may in some cases trigger a 
substantial risk of bodily harm.234
 
B. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
 
[73]  If, however, the disclosure of information is a consequence of 
information received by the government by a resident seeking to obtain 
important but not indisputably essential services, such as a driver’s 
license, automobile registration, or the filing of property records, then 
intermediate scrutiny may be the appropriate standard for evaluating 
challenges to the government’s disclosure requirements.  The intermediate 
scrutiny standard of review as usually formulated requires the government 
to establish that its requirements “serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”235  
It has been applied most often, but not exclusively, in cases involving 
gender discrimination.236   
                                               
229 Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (1993). 
230 Id. at 1354.  
231 Id. at 1355.  See also Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2003).  
232 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1064 (6th Cir. 1998).  See supra notes 
219-23 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra note 221. 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 151-152. 
235 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that Oklahoma gender-based 
distinction involving sale of 3.2% beer was denial of equal protection). 
236 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding 
constitutionality of Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 as applied to the states);  United 
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[74]  If the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to such a challenge by a 
resident, then the government must come forward with a substantial 
interest in disclosing this information in digital compilations that 
outweighs individual privacy interests.  In the light of the Whalen and 
Nixon decisions,237 the Second Circuit concluded: 
 
[S]ome form of intermediate scrutiny or balancing 
approach is appropriate as a standard of review . . . . [A]n 
intermediate standard of review seems in keeping both with 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize new 
fundamental interests requiring a high degree of scrutiny 
for alleged infringements, and the Court’s recognition that 
some form of scrutiny beyond rational relation is necessary 
to safeguard the confidentiality interest.238
 
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the panel found a substantial state interest 
in the financial disclosure law enacted by the City of New York.239  
Although the statute permitted public inspection of the filings and “the 
degree of intrusion stemming from public exposure of the details of a 
person’s life is exponentially greater than disclosure to government 
officials,”240 the court stated that the statute’s privacy mechanism 
“adequately protects plaintiffs’ constitutional privacy interests.”241  
                                                                                                                    
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding federal civil remedy created by 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 for victims of gender-motivated violence 
unconstitutional).   
237 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 
(1977). 
238 Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations 
omitted) (evaluating public access to financial disclosure forms required to be filed by a 
substantial number of  public employees of New York City). 
239 Id. at 1556, 1560; see NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § 1106-5.0 (1979) (requiring 
annual financial reports from many City officials but allowing any official to request that 
his report not be made available for public inspection because such inspection would 
constitute unwarranted invasion of privacy).  
240 Barry, 712 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 934 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
241 Barry, 712 F.2d at 1561.  The statute permitted a covered employee to request 
redaction from disclosure of information filed in the disclosure forms although, at the 
time of the Barry decision, the efficacy of this privacy protection provision was untested.  
The information was also protected by practical obscurity inasmuch as the financial 
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[75]  The collection of personally identifiable information by government 
for the purpose of operating a driver licensing system or a land records 
system undoubtedly serves important governmental objectives and is 
substantially related to the achievement of these objectives, but is the 
release of this information to the public, particularly in digital format, 
substantially related to the achievement of these objectives?  The answer 
should be no with regard to the objectives of the licensing and recording 
system.  The question becomes whether it is substantially related to the 
achievement of the objectives of the FOILs.  When government’s purpose 
is to serve its own administrative needs, not to assist in governmental 
decision making, then the answer should also be no.  The release of 
compilations of personally identifiable information in digital format is not 
central to the purposes of FOILs.  As the Supreme Court opined while 
considering the Federal FOIA in Reporters Committee, “the FOIA’s 
central purpose is to ensure that the Government’s activities be opened to 
the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens 
that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so 
disclosed.”242  The information privacy principle that governs requests for 
information about a particular private citizen is equally if not more 
applicable to requests for information about many citizens.  In addition, 
the information is almost always available through the components that 
fed the compilation or with redaction of the identifiers in releases in 
analog form. 
 
C. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
 
[76]  In many circumstances, information is supplied to the government by 
residents seeking access to its services, such as parks and libraries.  In 
these instances, the government is not forcing the disgorging of 
information, but requiring and collecting the information as a condition of 
making one of its services available.  This article has examined 
computerized information systems in use by parks and recreation 
departments243 and discussed library information systems.244  Personally 
                                                                                                                    
disclosure form was available only in hard copy at an administrative office.  NEW YORK 
CITY ADMIN. CODE § 1106-5.0 (1979).  
242 United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 774 (1989). 
243 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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identifiable information is collected and retained in these state and local 
government databases in order to administer the programs efficiently.  
Under state FOILs, however, it is available to requesters in electronic 
form, without notice to the residents.   
 
[77]  In order to avail themselves of the public service, residents are 
required to provide personally identifiable information and, usually 
unknowingly, to permit unlimited access to that information, leaving them 
with no ability to exercise their constitutional right to information privacy.  
Consequently, they must submit to an unconstitutional condition that 
violates their right to information privacy if they want access to that public 
service.  As long ago as 1926, the United States Supreme Court defined an 
unconstitutional condition: 
 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of 
state legislation which, by words of express divestment, 
seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result 
is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in 
exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens 
otherwise to withhold . . . . It is inconceivable that 
                                                                                                                    
244 See supra note 96 regarding the increasing use of RFID tags in libraries.  The 
increasing automation of library circulation systems has collided with the USA Patriot 
Act, § 215, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63 (2001), engendering controversy regarding government 
access to information in library databases. On July 8, 2004, a proposed amendment in the 
House of Representatives to the Fiscal 2005 Justice Department appropriations bill (HR 
4754, 111th Cong. (2004)) would have prohibited use of funds to acquire library 
circulation records or library patron lists.  The amendment was rejected by a tie vote after 
voting was held open for 30 minutes by Republican leaders to convince members to 
change their votes.  Limits on Federal Search Powers, CQ WKLY., Dec. 11, 2004, at 
2923-2924.  On June 15, 2005, however, the House approved, by a vote of 238-187, an 
amendment to the Fiscal 2006 Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations bill (HR 2862, 
112th Cong. (2005)) that would prohibit the FBI from fully using § 215 of the USA 
Patriot Act.  Seth Stern, House Votes to Limit Patriot Act, CQ WKLY., June 20, 2005, at 
1649.  The 2006 reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 109-178), by including 
a provision that libraries operating in traditional roles and not as internet service 
providers would not be subject to national security letters, should address some of the 
concerns.  Michael Sandler, Deal Clears Way for Anti-Terrorism Law, CQ WKLY., Mar. 
13, 2006, at 703. 
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guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United 
States may thus be manipulated out of existence.245  
 
[78]  The unconstitutional condition doctrine is now applied most often in 
the First Amendment context.246  It should be equally applicable in the 
context of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights.  Residents 
are asked to forsake their information privacy rights as a condition of 
availing themselves of state and local government services.  The databases 
supporting these services are maintained for the convenience and 
efficiency of the government in administering the programs.247  The 
information about individual residents is not used as a basis for 
governmental decisions and thus is not central to the purposes of FOILs.   
In addition, as previously discussed, there are options for making some or 
all of the information available in forms less threatening to information 
privacy rights of residents.248  Similarly, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine is also applicable to the types of information disclosure 
considered in the preceding strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny 
sections.  
 
C. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
[79]  Local governments desiring to control the dissemination of their 
databases have several options.  The haphazard manner in which decisions 
about collection, management, and release of personally identifiable 
information are now managed contributes significantly to the privacy 
problems they currently face.249   Consequently, local governments should 
designate an official, either full time or part time, as the chief privacy 
                                               
245 Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-4 (1926) (holding that California law 
requiring private automobile carriers for hire to obtain certificate and submit to regulation 
as common carrier exacted an unconstitutional condition and denied due process). 
246 See, e.g., Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (finding that a 
condition imposed by Congress (prohibiting representation involving effort to amend or 
challenge existing welfare law) on the use of Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funds 
violates the First Amendment rights of LSC grantees and their clients); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that government “may not deny a benefit 
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests–especially, his 
interest in freedom of speech”).   
247 Virtually all of these services were offered to residents in the era preceding the digital 
age. 
248 See supra Section IV.B.2.b. 
249 See WEST, supra note 98; e.g. Harmon, supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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officer of the jurisdiction.  As previously noted, few, if any, local 
governments currently have such a position.250  The chief privacy officer 
should be given responsibility for overseeing and assessing the impact that 
decisions about collection and release of data and placement of data on the 
jurisdiction’s internet website will have on individuals’ privacy.  The 
Office of Management and Budget Guidance on Implementing Privacy 
Provisions of the E-Government Act can serve as a model.251  Focused, 
systematic, and coherent attention to privacy issues will raise the level of 
awareness within the governmental entity and among local residents and 
should reduce mistakes and inadvertent actions by public officials.  
 
[80]  Local governments do not have standing to raise privacy issues on 
behalf of residents.252  Local officials can, however, notify affected local 
residents who then can litigate in their capacity as residents when a FOIL 
request presenting serious privacy concerns arises.  Indeed, as a broader 
matter, local jurisdictions should undertake the practice of notifying 
residents about FOIL requests that involve their personally identifiable 
information.  Notification can be made through notice in the local 
newspaper, a posting on the jurisdiction’s website, e-mail to a list of 
residents who have requested notification, and by other means.253  Under 
some circumstances, particularly when fundamental rights are affected, the 
jurisdiction may be constitutionally obligated to provide notice to those 
affected.254   
 
[81]  Another and potentially potent mechanism available to state and 
local jurisdictions is the judicious use of copyright.  A copyright can 
provide a local jurisdiction with the legal ability to control redistribution 
                                               
250 E.g. BARRETTE & GREENE, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
251 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899; see supra note 105. 
252 See, e.g., Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 609 A.2d 998, 1002 
(Conn. 1992) (holding that “[w]e have uniformly resisted the efforts of litigants to assert 
constitutional claims of others not in a direct adversarial posture before the court” 
(quoting Southern Connecticut Gas Co. v. Housing Authority, 468 A.2d 574 (1983)).   
253 The California Breach Law, effective July 1, 2003, provides for notifications 
regarding breaches of security by written notice, electronic notice, and substitute notice 
by e-mail when the agency has an e-mail address for the subject persons, conspicuous 
posting on the agency’s website, and notification to major statewide media.  CALIF. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.29(g) (2004). 
254 E.g. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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of information it provides in response to FOIL requests.255  Use of 
copyright, however, raises a number of legal issues.  Can the databases at 
issue be copyrighted?    Does the state FOIL abrogate the authority of 
local governments to invoke copyright protection?  Can the requirements 
of the FOIL be satisfied if copyright protection is invoked?   
 
[82]  All of these issues were addressed in an important Second Circuit 
case, County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real Estate 
Solutions,256 involving the attempt by Suffolk County to copyright and 
control redistribution of the County’s official tax maps.257  Having 
obtained the official tax maps from Suffolk County through a FOIL 
request, First American then marketed copies of the tax maps and CD-
ROM disks containing the maps without the consent of or a license from 
the County.258  The County initiated a legal action, alleging that its 
copyrights had been infringed.259  Both the State of New York and the 
City of New York appeared as amici curiae before the Second Circuit.260   
 
[83]  Regarding the substantive issues, the Second Circuit panel first 
found, citing a number of precedents and authorities, that, under the 
Copyright Act, “states and their subdivisions are not excluded from 
protection under the Act.”261  Consequently, states and their subdivisions, 
unless prohibited from doing so by specific state law, may seek to 
copyright databases under their control.   
 
                                               
255 A fundamental right of the copyright owner is control of the distribution of the 
copyrighted material.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000).                                        . 
256 County of Suffolk, N.Y. v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
257 The tax maps and their index system provided the ownership, size, and location of real 
property in each of the County’s political subdivisions.  The maps are updated annually 
and cover over 500,000 parcels of land.  Id. at 184.  
258 Id. 
259 Id.  Once again, the typical pattern emerges.  A corporation obtains a database from a 
governmental entity through a FOIL request and then markets the data.  See, e.g. Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle,  Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial 
Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C.J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 595, 595-596 (2004).  
260 New York State and New York City also have sought to protect their GISs from 
uncontrolled distribution.  Both filed amicus curiae briefs as the Second Circuit 
considered the case.  County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 186.  
261 Id. at 187. 
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[84]  The Second Circuit then addressed the issue of whether the tax maps 
were copyrightable.  The panel concluded that, although “items such as 
street location and landmarks were ‘physical facts’–and thus not protected 
elements– . . . the presentation of such physical facts could be original.”262   
It further noted that even a slight amount of originality is sufficient for 
copyright and concluded that “Suffolk County has sufficiently alleged that 
its work is protected.”263  In reaching its conclusion, the panel relied to a 
significant degree upon the now classic Supreme Court decision in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.264  In reaching its 
conclusion that the white pages were not copyrightable, the Court 
distinguished between facts and compilations of facts: 
 
Copyright treats facts and factual compilations in a wholly 
consistent manner.  Facts, whether alone or as part of a 
compilation, are not original and therefore may not be 
copyrighted.  A factual compilation is eligible for copyright 
if it features an original selection or arrangement of facts, 
but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or 
arrangement.  In no event may copyright extend to the facts 
themselves.265
 
[85]  It is the creativity of the compilation that gives it the constitutionally 
required originality,266 but the compilation need possess only “at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.”267  Because digital databases involve 
the use of a program or system, it is unlikely that any digital compilation 
would fail to meet the requirement of minimal creativity. 
 
[86]  The panel also concluded that the tax maps were not inherently in the 
public domain because of the need for an economic incentive to create the 
                                               
262 Id. at 188. 
263 Id. 
264 Id.  499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that telephone white pages book was not 
copyrightable because factual information lacked the requisite originality). 
265 Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51. 
266 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by 
securing for a limited time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
Respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
267 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.   
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work, and because they were not themselves necessary to give the public 
notice of the law.268  Thus, the maps could be copyrighted.   
 
[87]  The panel then focused on the knotty question of whether the New 
York FOIL abrogated Suffolk County’s copyright.  After a careful 
analysis of the statute, rejecting a contrary interpretation by the State’s 
Committee on Open Government, it concluded that there was no clear 
indication that the State Legislature intended to abrogate a covered entity’s 
copyright: 
 
By the statute’s plain language, the extent of the state 
agency’s obligation is to make its records available for 
public inspection and copying.  It is one thing to read this 
provision to permit a member of the public to copy a public 
record, but it is quite another to read into it the right of a 
private entity to distribute commercially what it would 
otherwise, under copyright law, be unable to distribute.269
 
[88]  In what is perhaps the most important aspect of the opinion, the court 
concluded that Suffolk County could maintain its copyright protections 
while complying with its FOIL obligations.270  The court reasoned that the 
New York FOIL does not explicitly address what a recipient can do once 
it receives agency records; it only requires that the agency make the 
records available for public inspection and copying.271  “FOIL . . . does 
not prohibit a state agency from placing restrictions on how a record, if it 
were copyrighted, could be subsequently distributed.”272  The panel 
reasoned as follows: 
 
Suffolk County is not attempting to restrict initial access 
but is attempting to restrict only the subsequent 
redistribution of its copyrighted works.  There is nothing 
inconsistent between fulfilling FOIL’s goal of access and 
permitting a state agency to place reasonable restrictions on 
the redistribution of its copyrighted works.  For example, 
                                               
268 County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 194-195. 
269 Id. at 189. 
270 Id. at 191. 
271 Id. at 192-93. 
272 Id. at 192. 
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an agency’s choice to notify the recipient that a portion of 
the record is protected by copyright law or an agency’s 
requirement that the recipient enter into a licensing 
agreement if it wishes to distribute the record commercially 
does not restrict initial access but only what the recipient 
may do once it acquires access.273
 
[89]  The Court cautioned that the County could not restrict subsequent 
dissemination completely because copyright protects only the form of 
expression and not the ideas expressed or the facts included and is subject 
to the fair use doctrine.274  The form of expression, however, should 
incorporate the use of orthophotography and arc info coverages, as well as 
the SQL server databases referenced to GIS data.275  
 
[90]  The Second Circuit encompasses New York, Connecticut, and 
Vermont.  Its conclusion that, absent an explicit action by a state 
legislature, a state and its local governments may invoke copyright 
protection provides an important shield for privacy if properly applied by 
New York State and its localities.276  An examination of the Connecticut 
FOIA reveals no express abrogation of copyright authority for Connecticut 
or its localities.  Consequently, databases and systems, such as a locally 
created GIS, should be subject to copyright protection, in order to give the 
local jurisdictions control of subsequent dissemination of the information.  
Commercially developed recreation management systems are likely 
protected by the developer’s copyright.  Because some customization 
occurs with each user, and thus some elements of originality are added, the 
local government’s recreation management database is likely 
copyrightable as a derivative work.277     
 
[91]  Local governments can take an additional step by employing digital 
rights management (DRM) technology and placing a copyright 
management system, a digital “fence,” around the data given to a 
requestor.  As described by one commentator, digital rights management 
                                               
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 193. 
275 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
276 County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 195.   
277 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
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technology employs digital technology to give copyright owners control 
over the use of their protected work: 
 
DRM software prevents purchasers and third parties from 
making unauthorized uses of digital works. DRM 
technology has two separate functions.  First, it identifies 
digital versions of copyrighted works. . . . Copyright 
owners use two main types of existing technologies, known 
as “watermarking” and “fingerprinting,” to create digital 
identifications for their works. . . . Second, DRM software 
may also provide copyright owners with control over the 
various excludable rights of copyright ownership, including 
. . . the ability to make copies of and redistribute the 
work.278
 
At least in the Second Circuit, the County of Suffolk decision, by 
concluding that state and local governments can enforce copyright 
protection,279 appears to permit states and localities to employ digital 
rights management technology to protect their copyrights.      
  
[92]  Digital fences, however, can be broken.  If a digital fence is used to 
protect the copyright or to prevent manipulation of the data, then the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides some limited 
protection.280  The requester would have legitimate access if given a copy 
of the information protected by a DRM system.  Because of fair use 
considerations, a person with legitimate access does not violate the 
DMCA by seeking to break through the digital fence.  Assisting someone 
who attempts to duplicate the data, however, would subject the person 
assisting to the penalties of the DMCA.281
                                               
278 Daniel Benoliel, Comment, Technological Standards, Inc.: Rethinking Cyberspace 
Regulatory Epistemology, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1084-85 (2004) (internal citations 
omitted). 
279 County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 195. 
280 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332 (2000); 
28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000) (governing assumption of contractual obligations related to 
transfers of rights in motion pictures).  For a detailed analysis of the applicability of the 
DMCA, see David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000). 
281 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332 (2000); 
28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).  Such a use of the DMCA could create strange bedfellows, with 
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[93]  It is not altogether clear that the requirements of the New York FOIL 
and the Connecticut FOIA that records be provided in electronic format282 
prohibit the states or their localities from placing a digital fence around the 
data even if it is not protected by copyright.  Although the DMCA 
penalties would not be applicable, such a step would at least make data 
matching and related activity more difficult. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
[94]  States and local governments are rushing headlong into the digital 
age, in most instances heedless of the impact upon the privacy of 
residents.  Justice Brennan warned almost 30 years ago that data in 
electronic form “vastly increase[s] the potential for abuse of that 
information.”283  These advances into the digital age are occurring in the 
context of open government laws enacted almost 40 years ago.  
Consideration of the information privacy concerns and rights of residents 
is barely on the radar screen of public officials; yet commercial entities, 
mischief makers, and evildoers are well aware of the opportunities 
presented.   
 
[95]  A RAND study published several years ago commented upon the 
significance of privacy considerations in e-commerce:  
 
Privacy is considered by industry as a nice-to-have but not 
need-to-have feature of E-commerce.  If customers demand 
it, companies will supply–not necessarily enthusiastically 
(after all, customer lists have resale value), but willingly 
enough.  But the onus on this side of the Atlantic is on the 
customer’s caring enough about privacy to make it an 
important factor….”284       
                                                                                                                    
privacy advocacy groups joining the entertainment industries in support of some of the 
more controversial provisions of the Act. 
282 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §1-211(a) (2003); N.Y. PUB. O. LAW § 88 (Consol. 1999); 
Brownstone Publishers, Inc. v. New York City, 550 N.Y.S. 2d 564 (1990) (in response to 
FOIL request by publishing company, New York City Department of Buildings ordered 
to provide records on computer tape rather than hard copy).   
283 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
284 LIBICKI, ET. AL., supra note 71, at 101. 
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Similarly, in the public sector, residents need to be increasingly educated 
regarding the impact of the lack of attention to privacy upon their lives, 
and must press state legislatures to make needed adjustments to decades-
old FOILs.  The framers of the FOILs undoubtedly did not intend to 
jeopardize the lives and fortunes of the residents of their states but, as a 
consequence of technological inversion, that is the present consequence of 
the FOILs as they are now applied.285  As sports coaches often say, let us 
“return to the fundamentals.”286 The underlying purpose of FOILs is to 
shed light on “the process of government decision-making” and, 
concomitantly, to make available documents and statistics “leading to 
determinations.”287  This purpose is not advanced by forcing the release of 
databases containing personally identifiable information about residents 
that has been accumulated to enable the government to function with 
greater efficiency.  FOILs should be limited to advancing their 
fundamental purpose and should recognize the privacy concerns of 
residents.  Unfortunately, it likely will take a major tragedy to focus the 
attention of the state legislatures upon these changes. 
 
[96]  In the interim, residents need to assert their constitutional and 
statutory rights to informational privacy aggressively.  In addition, they 
must press their local governments to address privacy concerns and to 
focus on privacy as an important priority.  At a minimum, local 
governments should designate chief privacy officers.  The diffusion of 
responsibility for addressing privacy matters leaves no one responsible 
and does not force public administrators to take privacy concerns into 
consideration.  The consequences of lack of attention to information 
                                               
285 As Justice Brandeis admonished:  
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
Government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert 
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but 
without understanding.   
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted).    
286 D. Orlando Ledbetter, Game Day SEC, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Oct. 30, 
2004, at E16. 
287 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (Consol. 2005).  See supra note 120 and 
accompanying text.   
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privacy by state and local governments will lead to an increase in criminal 
activity facilitated by anachronistic laws and policies. 
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